U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN MEXICO AND ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

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U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN MEXICO AND ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

TUESDAY, JULY 22, 1986

House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:35 a.m., in room 340, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Charles B. Rangel (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Charles B. Rangel, James H. Scheuer, Frank J. Guarini, Walter E. Fauntroy, Solomon P. Ortiz, Michael G. Oxley, Duncan Hunter, and Joseph J. DioGuardi.

Staff present: John T. Cusack, chief of staff; George R. Gilbert, counsel; Barbara A. Stolz, professional staff member; and Elliott A. Brown, minority staff director.

Mr. Scheuer [acting chairman]. Good morning.

Today, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control will examine the United States' narcotics control efforts in Mexico and along our southwest border.

From January 12 of 1986 to January 19, this Select Committee conducted a study mission on the southwest border of the United States and Mexico. We held hearings in three border cities—El Paso, Tucson, and San Diego—to examine all of the questions surrounding the illegal narcotics traffic between Mexico and the United States, and in Mexico we met with U.S. Embassy personnel, including our ambassador, John Gavin—the ambassador at that time—with the Mexican attorney general, Sergio Garcia Ramirez, and the president of Mexico, Miguel de la Madrid. Our discussions focused on the status of the illegal narcotics crop eradication in Mexico and other elements of the U.S.-Mexican cooperation on narcotics control efforts.

The committee also conducted a field inspection of opium poppy eradication efforts in Culiacan, Mexico.

The results of our study mission both on the three border towns that I mentioned—El Paso, Tucson, and San Diego—and our discussions with U.S. diplomatic personnel and Mexican Government personnel couldn't have been more discouraging.

Drug trafficking between the United States and Mexico from Mexico to the United States is out of control. Our borders are out of control. It's not an exaggeration to say that the borders are virtually nonexistent, they're so porous.

Mexico now supplies somewhere over 40 percent of all heroin and about a third of all of the marijuana and a third of all the cocaine entering the United States.

Our border narcotics control efforts are failing and failing pitifully and miserably. Drugs are freely smuggled from Mexico into the United States by land, by sea, and by air. And here is our chairman approaching us by land—do you want to take over?

Mr. RANGEL. No, no.

Mr. SCHEUER. Much of this traffic comes right through our official ports of entry, where the immense volume of traffic and pitifully inadequate numbers of Customs and INS personnel make possible only a cursory inspection of vehicles, pedestrians, and cargo.

In 1985, only 52 pounds of heroin and 390 pounds of cocaine were seized at border crossing stations on the Mexican border. Airborne smugglers can penetrate our southwest border at will, because there is little or no radar coverage below 5,000 feet. Aircraft to intercept, track, and apprehend smugglers are extremely limited. Our understaffed and frequently insufficiently equipped Federal enforcement forces are virtually powerless to stop the increasing flow of drugs across the Mexican border.

At our hearings on the border, Federal drug enforcement officials testified that, regardless of the additional resources that they are given, they couldn't substantially reduce the amount of drugs coming into the United States until steps are taken to reduce both illegal drug production abroad and the domestic demand for drugs. In other words, the attempt to interdict the flow of drugs once the stuff has been grown and harvested, with the enormous demand for it in America, is virtually impossible.

The rapidly deteriorating situation on our southwest border is due primarily to the abysmal failure of our anti-narcotics programs in Mexico, and our January study mission confirmed our worst fears about narcotics control efforts in Mexico both by the Mexicans and the United States.

Mexico is the single largest supplier of heroin and marijuana to the U.S. market today. Illegal, illicit production of opium and marijuana in Mexico is expanding. The Mexican Government's program to eradicate illegal and illicit marijuana and opium production, once the model for the rest of the world, is now ineffective.

Cooperation between the United States and Mexico on narcotics control has faltered badly. Mexico's failure for over a year to take vigorous investigative action in the murder of the Drug Enforcement agent, Enrique Camarena, and to bring justice to those responsible for this heinous crime epitomizes the painful lack of cooperation between our two countries.

Mexico has also failed to initiate an effective narcotics enforcement program to investigate, arrest, prosecute, convict, and incarcerate important drug traffickers, their failure to confiscate clandestine drug laboratories, and their failure to prevent international traffickers from using Mexico as a transit base to smuggle illegal drugs into the United States.

Underlying the collapse of Mexico's narcotics eradication and enforcement programs and the breakdown of narcotics cooperation with the United States is, of course, rampant corruption. Members of the Select Committee were dismayed to hear from Mexico's top leaders themselves about the depth of corruption at all levels of government in Mexico.

In recent months, administration officials and spokesmen in Congress, alike, have been sharply critical of corruption in Mexico and Mexico's lack of effective narcotics control efforts. The administration, however, shares responsibility for the ground lost in Mexico for failing to demonstrate leadership in developing a comprehensive foreign policy to address narcotics problems in Mexico and the host of social and economic problems that foster the drug trade.

In our report on our study mission to the southwest border and Mexico, the Select Committee has proposed a number of recommendations to improve drug control efforts on the border and in Mexico, and a summary of these recommendations appears on p. 102.

Our hearing today will examine progress in narcotics control efforts in Mexico and on the border in the light of the committee's recommendations. We will also review the administration's plan for a new southwest border drug enforcement initiative.

In view of the military's assistance to drug enforcement efforts in Bolivia, we will also look into what type of expanded military assistance we might see to seal our own borders against drug smugglers under the new National Security directive that defines drug smuggling as a threat to our national security.

At this time, I would be happy to yield to our chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. I wish, Mr. Scheuer, that you would stay with us. Unfortunately, the tax-writing committee is working on the tax conference as well as reconciliation on the budget, and, as you know, Benjamin Gilman will not be with us as he attends the funeral of our late colleague, George O'Brien. So I will be leaving the committee from time to time, but I'm glad that Frank Guarini and Solomon Ortiz are here to help us out.

I just would want to say that it would be very, very helpful if the administration would take this opportunity this morning to share with us our foreign policy strategy as relates to the Government of Mexico.

We really did not need outstanding administration officials to put out to us the depth of corruption that exists in Mexico; we knew that. We really didn't need responsible Federal officials to point out to us how wide open our borders are as relates to illegal immigrants as well as illicit contraband; we know that.

What we don't know is what is the policy as relates to the Government of Mexico. We know that they're on the brink of financial disaster, but we have no idea as to what, if anything, is being done in their eradication effort.

I was one of the people that went out of my way to laud the administration for giving assistance to the beleaguered country of Bolivia. I think that we'll be prepared to do the same thing for Peru and for Colombia, but I can't, in God's name, explain to my community why we're not prepared to give any assistance to those people who are attempting to patrol our borders and to protect the integrity of our great Nation.

I do hope, notwithstanding the prepared testimony, and notwithstanding the fact that the assistant secretary designate for international narcotics matters was unable to be here, that somebody would be able to let us know what, if anything opium and marijuana eradication has to do with the State Department's relationship with the Government of Mexico.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is some concern that we don't have an assistant secretary, we don't have an assistant secretary designate, but somebody is going to testify, I assume.

Is Mark Dion here?

Are the questions that I raised too sensitive for someone in your capacity to respond? because, if not, we're not here to embarrass you. It might be that we're prepared to wait.

[NOTE.—Assistant Secretary designate Wrobleski could not attend the hearing. Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Dion represented the Department of State.]

Mr. DION. Sir, it's up to you. I'm happy to speak to the question of our eradication program in Mexico, our narcotics program generally in Mexico.

Mr. RANGEL. One of the questions that the Members have is, how does this tie into our foreign policy? In other words, we hear a lot of statements from officials about corruption and about the borders and about giving some assistance. There's a front page story in the New York Times. Would your office interrelate those problems that we have with the eradication movement, if we have any at all going on?

Mr. DION. I can talk to you about the eradication program and what we are doing to make it more effective. I can also talk to you about our concern with corruption and so forth in Mexico.

Mr. RANGEL. Okay. Why don't we give it a try.

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I hope that we'll get some testimony from the deputy assistant secretary today or from the assistant secretary on another day on what our posture is vis-a-vis Mexico and what our program is both in international drug control and hardening up our border, vis-a-vis a country that is virtually in a state of collapse, not only economically but socially and politically.

Mexico is going through the most grave internal convulsions now as a result of the elections between the PRI and PAN with allegations, widely accepted allegations, of systematic and widespread fraud, widespread citizen unrest. That Government is on the knife's edge. It has stretched the social compact to the breaking point.

Certainly in our contingency planning, Mr. Deputy Assistant Secretary, we've got to do some contingency planning for what happens in the event that that social compact is stretched beyond the breaking point.

There are many serious people who predict the collapse of the Mexican Government and the Mexican political system under the stresses of the corruption, the inefficiency, and the emerging unacceptability of that as far as the public is concerned, the widespread protest.

We have to think about the implications of what might happen, a worst case scenario perhaps, but not a terribly hypothetical worst case, a worst case that could happen, what is going to be the effect of that on the integrity of our border, what is going to be the effect of that on the integrity of even the failing level of cooperation between Mexico and the United States on drug interdiction efforts now. We hope you will address those questions.

Mr. **Rangel**. Mr. Cash of the Drug Enforcement Administration will be assisting us on this panel as well.

Mr. **Scheuer**. Yes. Should we first recognize our colleagues? Duncan Hunter.

Mr. **Hunter**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to hear the testimony. I would just say that I know the chairman stated that the administration is responsible for the many problems and the lack of a coordinated policy with Mexico and the rest of our Central American neighbors with regard to narcotics interdiction.

I would stress that this Congress, for some time, has had a policy of building and shaping foreign affairs policy, as is quite clear from our recent debate over Central America and Nicaragua, and this Congress is also responsible for the lack of a coordinated policy with regard to narcotics interdiction, in my estimation, and I look forward to listening to the witnesses.

Mr. **Scheuer**. Congressman Solomon Ortiz.

Mr. **Ortiz**. I don't have any statement at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Scheuer**. Congressman Frank Guarini.

Mr. **Guarini**. I have no statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Scheuer**. Okay. Then we will hear from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mark Dion.

TESTIMONY OF JERROLD MARK DION, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. **Dion**. Mr. Chairman, Congressmen, beginning in the mid-1970's, narcotics control experts generally agreed that the Government of Mexico had successfully demonstrated the political will and capability to find and destroy illicit narcotics crops in the country. The aerial eradication campaign against opium poppy and cannabis and the high level of narcotics control cooperation between our governments were models for successive eradication campaigns in other countries.

Mr. **Rangel**. Excuse me, Secretary Dion.

Mr. **Dion**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Rangel**. You have a rather lengthy statement, and we have a large panel following this panel. I wonder whether you could take five or six minutes to sum up your statement and then give us some opportunity to ask you and Mr. Cash some questions.

Mr. **Dion**. I would just say, sir, that we had an extremely effective program in cooperation with the Mexican Government during the 1970's that succeeded in reducing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States and that became, in fact, a model program that was studied by other countries during this period, but that by the mid-1980's—that is to say, the last three years or so, there was general agreement that the campaign had lost much of its effectiveness, as you mentioned in your opening statement.

We believe that several factors have contributed to the erosion of the effectiveness of the Mexican eradication campaign—the downturn in the Mexican economy which has spurred farmers into this type of activity once again, a drop in the efficiency of the program itself, corruption at several levels of the Mexican Government, and such mundane things as rainfall and climate conditions that contributed to a rapid spread of these crops.

We noted in our annual report that production had increased dramatically in the last several years, and we have begun to work with the Mexican Government to remedy this situation. A series of high-level meetings—reported in the newspapers—were held between the Attorneys General of the United States and Mexico; these quarterly meetings included representatives of State, Justice, and Treasury; and there was a general agreement with the Mexican Government to seek remedies for the worsening drug situation in the country.

The latest of these four quarterly meetings was at Cancun in April, where a number of new initiatives were considered to improve the eradication program. These were such things as agreeing on a new data base, a system to collate information on the program, to expand the number of aircraft spraying and to carry out an aerial survey of the crop area in Mexico. The last measure has already been concluded, and the results will become available this fall.

We are also helping the Mexican authorities to integrate a new aircraft that have become available for crop dusting activities—the turbo Thrush aircraft—and, in fact, a special operation will be carried out this fall involving six turbo Thrush aircraft that will be supported by the Mexican Attorney General's fleet of helicopters, including three high capacity Bell 212 helicopters.

We believe that the fall operation will be an extremely effective effort to cut the production of opium in the tri-state area of Mexico and will bring the situation back under better control. This is not to say that it is not a very grave problem and is our highest priority in our world-wide narcotics control agenda. We're working with the Mexican Government to try to improve the effectiveness of the program.

We are also carrying out training seminars and improving safety programs, working on new formulations of herbicides for attacking drug crops and cooperating with the Mexican attorney general's office in an effort to restore the effectiveness of the eradication program.

[The statement of Mr. Dion for Ann Wrobleski appears on p. 53.]

Mr. SCHEUER. Does that complete your testimony?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. All right. Now we'd like to hear from Thomas V. Cash, deputy assistant administrator for operations of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS V. CASH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. CASH. Thank you, Mr. Scheuer, Chairman Rangel, Congressmen.

The program that Deputy Assistant Secretary Dion referred to is one that we Operation Vanguard, and it's a United States operation conducted jointly with the Government of Mexico in which U.S. observers accompany verification elements of the Mexican Attorney General's office to verify cannabis and poppy herbicidal eradication. Thus, through Operation Vanguard, assistance is provided by DEA to the Mexican attorney general's office and his eradication program. Aerial reconnaissance is used to detect the location of the illicit cultivation sites and then to verify their destruction.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Dion's statement contains the detailed reporting on the spraying outcome as reported by the Mexican attorney general's office, so I'll not repeat that information here. However, it's worth noting that in the February to March 1986 phase of Operation Vanguard it proved to be one of the most productive in the history of this special program. Total flight hours were up, and the verification program was generating encouraging information.

During this phase, maintenance problems were minimal, with only routine down times arising as scheduled inspections came due. There are regular meetings between the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Mexican attorney general's office, which is in charge of this program, to discuss any problems which could negatively impact on this important program.

That's all I have to say at this time, sir.

[The statement of Mr. Cash appears on p. 63.]

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Secretary, you indicated that Mexico has the highest priority with this administration as relates to drug eradication?

Mr. DION. Drug control programs generally, yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Now when we visited Mexico, we were allowed to believe that prior to Operation Vanguard all of those programs were in a shambles, that they didn't have the equipment, nor did we have the personnel there.

Is that so, from the Drug Enforcement Administration, Mr. Cash, that prior to Operation Vanguard there wasn't much of a joint cooperative effort in Mexico in the area of eradication?

Mr. CASH. Regretfully, Chairman Rangel, that precedes my time in headquarters. I was in the field, so I do not know what the situation was at that time. I do know that there were some early start-up problems caused by earthquakes and some hurricanes.

Mr. RANGEL. Do you know, Mr. Secretary, just what the condition was prior to Operation Vanguard in Mexico as relates to narcotics controls?

Mr. DION. Operation Vanguard, a verification program, is one part of the overall eradication program, sir, which began in 1974 with a fleet of aircraft for aerial eradication of drug crops in the fields.

As I said at the outset, it was generally conceded to be a very successful program until the early 1980's. Beginning in late 1983 and early 1984, it began to loose its effectiveness, partly because of the downturn in the Mexican economy, partly because of inefficiency, and that includes problems of personnel.

Mr. **Rangel**. Mr. Secretary, when this committee visited Mexico, when Gavin was there and we found out for the first time we had no eradication program at all? What year was that?

Mr. **Cusack**. We found out there was a breakdown in narcotic——

Mr. **Rangel**. Was that 1984?

Mr. **Cusack**. Eighty-three.

Mr. **Rangel**. Eighty-three. And we were shocked to find that we had not known that the situation was so bad. Our ambassador told us that we should expect a lot of progress because the preceding administration had been guilty of so much corruption that they never were really able to get a handle on it and that we were going to look forward to a new era of cooperation between our Government and the Government of Mexico.

Now if this is the highest priority in the Vanguard Operation, which was initiated some time late last year/early this year, could anyone share with this committee just how many opium fields or how much marijuana has been eradicated at any point that you think would be best—share with us what is going on down in Mexico? All I hear is that we've got aerial surveys, we've got new planes, and we've got a new sense of priority. But could you tell me what has been done in the last six months, year, or two years?

Mr. **Dion**. I think, sir, in the last year a good deal of progress has been made toward restoring the effectiveness of the eradication program and that the results will soon be seen.

Mr. **Rangel**. How far back would you have to go to tell me about an effective eradication program in Mexico?

Mr. **Dion**. I think that we could say that was in 1981—we have figures on the hectares eradicated for 1985, but we don't have figures yet for 1986, when we anticipate a considerable improvement.

Mr. **Rangel**. Mr. Hesse, would you want to come up here and answer, when last have we had an effective eradication program in Mexico?

Mr. **Hesse**. In every year, starting in 1974 through approximately 1981, Mr. Chairman, the amounts of marijuana eradicated in Mexico and opium poppy eradicated in Mexico were on a downward curve to the point where we estimated that heroin produced from opium poppy derivative from Mexico was 30 percent or less of the United States market in 1980 and 1981.

In the period in which you were in Mexico in 1983, there was a commitment made by the administration of President de la Madrid to increase the amount of opium poppy eradicated.

Our surveys indicate that—while Mexico eradicated more poppy in 1985 than in 1984—the amount of opium poppy eradicated has not kept pace with the expansion of opium poppy cultivation, and thus, net opium production has increased, from 17 metric tons in 1983 to as much as 45 metric tons in 1985.

In the first six months of this year, we estimate that some 1,500 hectares have been eradicated. If the sweep operation that we are proposing for the period beginning in September takes effect, we have a potential not only of exceeding that figure, but, given that the target zone is the primary area for poppy cultivation we think we can vastly improve in just this last six months of the year the total record for all of 1986.

We are very optimistic about the potential for this operation in terms of the cooperation that is given, Congressman Scheuer, a sovereign government, the Government of Mexico, is allowing the United States Government to bring in aircraft and commercial spray pilots—crop dusters, if you will—to assist them in this operation. That same sovereign government has, because it lacked the technical capability, allowed us to do a survey of their opium poppy crop using a U.S. commercial firm, and U.S. pilots, and have that film processed in the United States. Not many governments will go to that degree of cooperation.

Mr. Rangel. Mr. Hesse, do you know the degree of cooperation that we are extending to the Government of Mexico to prop up its economy in terms of trade, in terms of opening up our borders? Do you know the extent of cooperation we're giving to this government? And you're telling this committee that we are not aware of the fact that they are allowing our planes to enter the sovereign State of Mexico, as that poison that is produced in Mexico pours across our border with a lot of the Mexican people that have no right to enter our country?

What kind of priority is this? A country that's prepared to be invited in and bring in the Marines to invade a country, a country that's prepared to bomb a country because of evidence that terrorism initiated there, and you're sharing with Mr. Scheuer the fact that we should be aware that the Government of Mexico is allowing United States citizens to come in there and try to attempt to contain the depth of corruption that's centered around the illicit growth of opium and marijuana.

Well, we're fully aware of it, but this Congress is prepared to say to the Government of Mexico that all of the laws where we have given them preferential treatment in trade, all of the laws that we have in terms of exchange of people who violated the law, that we're prepared to take another look, and I assure you people in the State Department that we know how to create an atmosphere that could engender more cooperation from the Government of Mexico.

I would want you to believe that the Government of Bolivia did not open up its sovereign arms to allow us to come in to give them assistance until they first heard from the United States Congress as relates to sanctions.

So it surprises me, really, that you would think that we should send notes of thank you to the Government of Mexico to allowing us to be of some assistance to them. This Congress knows how to send a message, and if in five years the only thing that we've been able to accomplish is not even to hold on to the previous eradication effort but what we've been able to do is to take an aerial survey, to send six planes—and God knows who's using them, because we heard when the other planes were sent down they were used for other purposes—and to hold on and wait for this new program, Operation Vanguard.

What bothers me more than anything else is the testimony today that this has the highest priority as relates to narcotics control, because if this is the highest priority, God knows what we can expect to be coming across the Mexican border from other parts of Latin America.

Mr. HESSE. Mr. Chairman, if you would permit, in Mexico we have proven that narcotics control can work. We will prove again that narcotics control can work. The simple point that I was trying to make to the committee is that we have a problem in Mexico, and we're quite well aware of that problem, and that we are getting cooperation from the Government of Mexico.

Mr. RANGEL. Do you ever remember, Mr. Hesse, when the United States was not getting, quote, State Department cooperation from any government producing drugs?

I've been in the Congress 16 years, and whether we're talking about Turkey, Thailand, Burma, Mexico, Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, it seems to me that a part of testimony from the State Department is that we're receiving cooperation from these people.

My point to you was, I think we've been giving too much cooperation to them and getting very little in return for it.

Former President Nixon obviously knew how to get the attention of the Mexican Government. Were you with the State Department when he closed the borders?

Mr. HESSE. I was a consultant.

Mr. RANGEL. You were a consultant. Did we get their cooperation when they were saying that this was violative of their feelings of nationalism as related to opium eradication? Were you there?

Mr. HESSE. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Did they respond with a lot more cooperation than they did before that?

Mr. HESSE. There is a great degree of cooperation that was provided at that point in time, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. And do you believe perhaps if the United States Congress and this administration indicated that we're not satisfied with the cooperation that we receive from Mexico, and indicated in terms of stronger language than in the past, we might get better cooperation from the people of Mexico?

Mr. HESSE. I think, sir, that the record of the meetings that have been held between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Secretary Sepulveda, between Attorney General Meese and Attorney General Garcia Ramirez, amply document that the Government of Mexico is well aware of the discontent not only in the Congress but in this administration.

Mr. RANGEL. I'm not going to insist that you answer my question, but, you know, attorneys general meeting with attorneys general and secretaries of state meeting with secretaries of state have not alleviated the problem on our borders, and you know that, and I was asking whether or not the Congress could do something to be of assistance, but that was an unfair question because the State Department could not possibly suggest that we do anything except try to improve the degree of cooperation that we already have. I understand your position.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes. I'd like to recognize Duncan Hunter of California.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's still a little bit unclear to me as to whether or not, from 1981 on, we have been losing in the eradication program because the production of the narcotics has gone up dramatically and we have held constant in our eradication program, or the eradication program itself has eroded and gone downhill and we're eradicating less each year. Could you inform us as to what situation exists?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

The production has gone up; that's unquestioned. The amount of poppy eradicated has increased but has not kept up with the increase in production.

[NOTE.—The Government of Mexico reported 3200 hectares eradicated in 1984 and 5600 hectares in 1985. Discounting Army claims, we believe the figure for 1985 should be 2750 hectares, 1984 was more probably 1800-2000 hectares.]

Mr. HUNTER. You say it has gone up?

Mr. DION. I'd say that the acreage eradicated has increased year by year, although there is some confusion because of the base statistics used by the Mexican Army for its part of the program. But, generally speaking, the eradication program would have kept up if cultivation had not increased so dramatically.

Mr. HUNTER. How do we verify that?

Mr. DION. We're verifying that through a variety of means, including this new aerial survey which we've completed on and through Operation Vanguard in which DEA agents are accompanying Mexican verification program officials flying around the countryside and seeing areas that have been eradicated and verifying that indeed the number of acres have been killed.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Well, I'm still a little bit confused. Operation Vanguard was successful up through 1981. In what sense? That we in fact eradicated a fairly large portion of the narcotics that were being grown in Mexico? Was that the standard?

[NOTE.—There is confusion about names. The Committee should know that the eradication program began in 1974. Vanguard, the latest verification program, began in earnest in 1985.]

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. What was the percent?

Mr. DION. I couldn't give you the precise figures on the percentage, but, as Mr. Hesse remarked, the amount of heroin and marijuana reaching the United States from Mexico decreased dramatically during those years; it has now gone back up. At one point, Mexico was producing 65 tons of opium a year. It fell as low as around 17 tons. It's now around 40 or 45.

Mr. HUNTER. I heard at one time that the reason that the eradication program was doing less in proportion to the total acreage was because the American participation dwindled at the request of the Mexican Government and you no longer had American personnel flying the aircraft and seeing to it that this stuff was actually carried out. Now is that accurate?

Mr. DION. That's partially accurate but not entirely.

This is a Mexican program.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand.

Mr. DION. It's called the Mexican permanent Eradication Campaign.

Mr. HUNTER. I understand that, but——

Mr. DION. They staff the campaign but there are American technical experts, advisors, and so forth. There were perhaps fewer of those in recent years.

Mr. Hunter. Well, I understand from our people that that was what really made this program work, was the fact that we had Americans there who were seeing to it that it was done, that the American resources were utilized, in fact, to eradicate.

I've looked at the various newspaper clippings reflecting the meetings. It's still somewhat unclear as to what degree of participation the Americans will be allowed in the eradication program. Now are they flying the aircraft at this time?

Mr. Dion. No, sir. There are some aircraft that are being piloted by Americans, but they're in the training program; they're training Mexicans——

Mr. Hunter. Have we asked them to let us pilot these aircraft?

Mr. Dion. They have allowed us to pilot aircraft that are being used for training; yes, sir.

Mr. Hunter. Well, I'm talking about eradication aircraft, where you can——

Mr. Dion. They're eradication aircraft. Part of the training is eradicating——

Mr. Hunter. No, that's not my question. My point is that for the people that I talk to, they led me to believe that the reason we were effective, the eradication program was effective through 1981, was because Americans were in these aircraft and in fact were seeing to it that the eradication was done. They could come back from a mission and say, "Yes, I saw us spray" so many hectares or so many acres. It was important to our administration that we inject that element of American participation in the actual program back into the eradication program.

Now, number one, is that true? and, number two, if that is important, to have American participation, are we asking the Mexican Government to allow us to participate in the eradication—American personnel? And I guess the final follow-up question is, are they saying yes, or are they saying no?

Mr. Dion. I think that the answer to that is that in the early years there was an extensive training program that involved American pilots who were carrying out eradication operations as instructor.

In the late 1970's, the training was complete and the program became entirely Mexican; the Mexicans supplied all the pilots; they had been trained by us.

At this point, there are some Americans there—there will be more—training Mexicans to use new technology and new aircraft.

Mr. Hunter. Okay. So your answer is, they're not going to let us fly the missions with them, the eradication missions.

Mr. Dion. Only—as training missions, sir.

Mr. Hunter. Well, but as non-training operational missions, they're not going to let us fly.

Mr. Dion. I think you'd have to say no.

Mr. Hunter. Okay. Have we asked to be included in those missions?

Mr. Dion. We have discussed this with them on several occasions; yes, sir.

Mr. Hunter. Okay. Let me just say one thing in defense of the administration, too.

I remember, Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Camarena was killed, and the President of the United States essentially closed the border—at least, tightened it to the point where there was extreme protest. That protest—and Mr. Gavin was instrumental in that also—that protest that I saw came not from administration people about closing the border, it came from congressmen whose districts border the international border, and I thought that the administration was pretty tough in that regard, and I appreciate the fact that you and the committee were in Mexico City and found out that Mr. Caro Quintero, one of the suspects, was out dining at one of the fine restaurants when he was supposed to be waiting in prison for his judicial procedures, and you helped to get him back into that prison, and I think they ultimately fired the head of the prison.

But, in fact, I think the pressure that came from Mr. Gavin and from the President of the United States and what happened on the border, similar to what happened in the Nixon administration, did move the Mexican Government to pursue and arrest and, hopefully, at some point, to try Mr. Quintero, but today he resides in a prison in Mexico City because the administration, over the protests of congressmen—if they didn't close the border, I would say they severely slowed the border down to the point where there was a tremendous outcry from commercial interests along the international border.

Mr. **Rangel**. If the gentleman would yield, I would agree with you, but I don't think that three or four border congressmen would dictate our foreign policy, nor am I advocating that sanctions actually be used against any friendly country.

What bothers me is that it doesn't appear as though it's ever on the agenda of the State Department, and all we ever get is the expression of cooperation, which does not give the Congress enough information to act as partners in support of a foreign policy.

So I'm not arguing with you that we don't hear from Members of Congress, I'm just saying I don't count Members of Congress in terms of formulating a foreign policy.

Mr. **Guarini**. If the gentleman would yield, I don't think it's a matter of finding the blame. I think what we're looking for is not a defense but finding solutions, and I think my colleague, Mr. Hunter, made a very, very good point about the fact that all the figures that you give us are suspect. There is no verification of anything as to what is going on down there. They have taken our pilots out of their planes, they do not give us the statistics that are accurate or verifiable.

In fact, when we were down there, we understand that there were some fields that were counted two or three times, so that there is no way that we can depend on the statistics that we receive.

What we do know is that there are more and more drugs illegally coming up through our border than ever before, and I think it gets down to the fact that we have not put enough pressure, have not taken enough positive steps to assure ourselves of the cooperation of Mexico, and that there is a void of good faith here in dealing with the entire problem.

We know that the corruption is very pervasive, and we know that they want our help in many ways economically, and we're willing to be a good neighbor, but unless the State Department starts exerting more pressure on Mexico, you're not going to get any positive results.

We need verifiable figures; we don't have that. Everything you told us about what is happening and the cooperation with Mexico, and what fields are being eradicated, and how much success you've had with them, I believe, is suspect, because anything you can't verify I don't believe.

Mr. **Oxley**. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. **Scheuer**. Excuse me. Can we have some regular order here? We'll get to you, Congressman.

Mr. Solomon Ortiz hasn't been recognized. I'd like to recognize him, and then I'll recognize you.

Mr. **Oxley**. Thank you.

Mr. **Ortiz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will follow the same line of questioning.

You said that the production of opium at one time was up to—what?—65 metric tons?

Mr. **Dion**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Ortiz**. Then it went down to about 35.

Mr. **Dion**. Around 30. In fact, it went as low as 17, Mr. Hesse reminds me. It went as low as 17 in 1983.

Mr. **Ortiz**. It's up to about——

Mr. **Dion**. It's around 40 to 45 now.

Mr. **Ortiz**. One of the reasons I ask is because, as we talk about eradication, there were some rumors—and maybe you can verify this—that instead of using the herbicide that they use, that they were using water to spray. Can you enlighten us on that rumor?

Mr. **Dion**. Yes, sir. We've tried to answer that question before.

They do, indeed, use water to clean out the tanks of the spray aircraft, but they're not spraying water on the fields, or at least they should not be. That would be a misuse of the aircraft. So that we know that they use water on occasion to flush out the tanks and so forth, but, the fields are being sprayed with herbicide.

We do, indeed, sir, have a verification program. It is the Operation Vanguard which Mr. Cash referred to in which DEA agents go out in aircraft and look at fields that have been reported sprayed and verify that those fields indeed have been sprayed and that the crop has been destroyed. They now report around 85 percent verification, which means the fields that are now being sprayed and that are checked by the DEA agents are found to be 85 percent destroyed.

Mr. **Ortiz**. What is the SOP? I mean when do they flush the water? During flight, or do they do it when they are on the ground?

Mr. **Dion**. When they clean the tanks of the spray aircraft, they use water to flush the tanks out.

Mr. **Ortiz**. Do they do it while they're flying, or do they do it while the airplane is stationary?

Mr. **Dion**. They take them up in the air and flush the tanks out and then land again. So that their taking off and spraying fields with water instead of herbicide is a widely rumored charge. The fact of the matter is, why would they bother to spray the field with water? I mean, if they're not going to spray the field, they could just stay on the ground.

Mr. ORTIZ. Some of my colleagues have a good point. They say that this might serve as a fertilizer.

Mr. DION. That's another story; yes, sir; we've heard that rumor.

Mr. ORTIZ. Let me ask another question now.

Mr. SCHEUER. It is a fertilizer. That's not a joke.

Mr. DION. Yes, sir. Some of the herbicide that's used to kill the crops——

Mr. SCHEUER. When you mix a herbicide with water and spray it, it's a fertilizer. A herbicide kills because it stimulates abandoned, explosive growth, but when you mix it with water and dilute it, then it is a fertilizer; that ain't no joke.

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. And that's apparently—production is up.

Mr. DION. We have one of our authorities on herbicides from our bureau here today; he could talk to you at some length. But, in fact, they do use fertilizer to kill the crop, but it's applied in such heavy dosage that it kills the poppy plant.

Mr. SCHEUER. Correct. But when you lighten the dose by diluting it, then you're not spraying out something that will kill the crops, you're spraying out something that's going to fertilize the crops.

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. Can you give us a history of how that has happened—how widespread that has been?

Mr. DION. Well, we don't know how widespread it has been in the past, but one of the initiatives that we've taken in the last year is to assure that the mix of herbicide to water will indeed kill the crops, and this practice is now being followed in the program, and this can be checked.

Mr. SCHEUER. Yes.

Congressman Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. My district borders Mexico, and of course I am very, very concerned about what's happening. Do you really think that the Mexican Government is very serious about reversing the trend that we've had for the past years as far as crippling the narcotics mafia—whatever you want to call it—and working with the United States police? Do you think they're serious about it?

Mr. DION. If it's cases of arrests and convictions and so forth, I would defer to Mr. Cash, but in terms of restoring the aerial eradication program to its former levels, we think that they're indeed serious and that this is their intention, and that they are trying to make the efforts necessary to bring the program back to where it was in the 1970's and early 1980's.

Mr. ORTIZ. Of course, a lot has been said about corruption this morning, and I can understand that, yes, there are some serious problems.

I used to be the sheriff of a pretty good sized county that was close to Corpus Christi, and I've had good relationships with some of the Mexican police. Of course, I don't want to leave an impression that all of them are crooks or all of them are dirty, because we do find honest policeman. In fact, I was in contact with Mr. Ventura, who is head of the Federal Police of Mexico, and I think he is a man that has visited the United States. He is very serious about trying to do something to stop the flow of narcotics into this country.

On the other hand, I think that every barrel has a bad apple, and I hope that we can continue to work with him and, as has been stated before, that we can apply the necessary pressure to stop this flow of traffic, because it's ruining a lot of lives, and as we go back and we look at how much—do you have any idea as to how much money we're spending when we talk about aircraft, not only to Mexico but to other countries—aircraft, helicopters, and so on and so forth—manpower? Do we have any idea how much money is being spent to stop the production and to stop the supply?

Mr. DION. Our budget, sir, is now about $60 to $65 million a year. So if you project that—our traditional budget, I would guess, in the 1970's was around $30 million a year. So over a period of 10 years you're talking about almost half a billion dollars.

Mr. ORTIZ. How about your budget, more or less? Do you have any idea?

Mr. CASH. The budget of the Drug Enforcement Administration, Congressman Ortiz, is $356 million, our entire budget worldwide and the budget for our operations in Mexico is around $4 million a year.

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the reasons, Mr. Chairman, that I ask this question is because there has been a lot of emphasis on the production and the supply, and if I might ask, how much money is being spent on trying to reduce the demand?

You know, there's a demand; that's why we have a supply; and I feel that this is why this is very, very interesting and very important, and I know that the chairman has an education bill, and I have another one. I hope that as we put money into trying to stop the supply and the production maybe something can be done to educate our people so that we can reduce the demand.

Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. Congressman Mike Oxley of Ohio.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, when we were in Mexico on the most recent visit there, we talked with the then Ambassador Gavin, and one of the things that he said that struck me the most was that there was a great deal of evidence that drugs coming from South America and Central America were trampolining—is the phrase he used—into this country from Mexico, meaning that some of the raw paste and some of the raw cocaine and other products were going into Mexico, there was more and more of a proliferation of these laboratories that would refine the product, and then of course it was brought into this country.

Is there any evidence, first of all, that that is starting to abate? and, secondly, is there some indication at some point that we might take the same measures against some of these laboratories that we took and are continuing to take in Bolivia?

Mr. Cash.

Mr. CASH. Congressman, first of all, I don't think that we have seen an abatement, in answer to your question. There certainly is an increasing amount of cocaine which is transiting through Mexico, based on the investigative activities of the agents that we have working with the MFJP in that country.

Mr. OXLEY. Is what the ambassador told us correct?

Mr. CASH. I think that that's substantially correct; yes, sir, I do.

Mr. OXLEY. And what about the future? Is there some possibility that we can, in fact, help the Mexican authorities to raid and destroy these types of laboratories that have continued to increase in Mexico?

Mr. CASH. I think that we would certainly encourage that, if the Government of Mexico would agree. As you know, we do nothing unilaterally and we would have to have, as we have in Bolivia, the cooperation of the government of Mexico.

At this particular point in time, there are an increasing number of seizures. Just in the last four or five months, there have been some very significant seizures in Mexico that we have brought to the attention of Mexican officials at the highest levels in order to make them aware of the role that Mexico is playing in transiting.

Most of the people that have been arrested, there were several cases of significance in Mexico—I have about five or six of them here right off the top of my head—at the 200 and 300 kilo level. This shows that cocaine is transiting from Bolivia and from Peru, but largely the transit traffic is in the hands of the Colombians.

Mr. OXLEY. Can those laboratories be identified? Are they, in fact, identified in some cases? Do the authorities know where they are?

Mr. CASH. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, in May the MFJP seized a cocaine laboratory on a ranch 90 miles south of Eagle Pass, Texas, in the Sierra Burro Mountains, and a Mexican national and Colombian national were identified as the proprietors.

So they do have from time to time laboratory seizures in Mexico. I cannot say that they are prolific at this time. Certainly the trend is there, though.

Mr. OXLEY. How does that work, to the uninitiated? The raw paste comes into Mexico, it's processed in the laboratories. What happens then?

Mr. CASH. Well, basically the reason that Mexico is felt to be probably a growing candidate for these types of laboratory activities, as the United States itself is a growing candidate, is because of the availability of ether and acetone in commercial quantities readily obtainable on the legal and licit market.

The coca paste is flown from the coca processing areas—that would normally be Bolivia and Peru—into a laboratory, and the hydrochloride process would then begin, using the converters of ether, acetone, and the necessary ingredients, into cocaine hydrochloride.

Mr. OXLEY. I noticed in one of the areas of testimony that automobiles and airplanes are still very popular transit modes for the drugs. Is that correct?

Mr. CASH. Yes, sir. I think that it's fair to say that the number of customs seizures at the border of automobiles and pedestrians, certainly indicate a high degree of activity in this area.

Mr. OXLEY. What is your opinion as to a strong immigration bill that hopefully would pass the Congress this year? What kind of help would that give? Maybe it ought to be for the second panel, but I would be curious, from your standpoint, what difference that might make if we can tighten the borders through stronger immigration laws.

Mr. CASH. Well, sir, it's got to have an impact. I think the Border Patrol is expecting 1.8 million illegal alien arrests, and if you ascribe, as we do, to the influx of a large amount of heroin and drugs across the border by persons and conveyances, any restriction, of course, is going to have a positive effect. But, as you know, there are a great many issues other than drugs involved in the immigration on question.

Mr. OXLEY. How much money can a mule make if he or she successfully transports some high-grade cocaine across the border?

Mr. CASH. Well, sir, normally it would depend on the amounts, but the normal fee is $5,000 a kilogram if you come by air. It would vary, of course, with the drug, and it would vary with the amount.

The mules, as you say, that come across the border, I'm sure my Customs colleagues would agree, are very attuned and adept at what our latest legal prosecutions are on this side, and so the amounts vary greatly insofar as what an individual courier or individual organization would bring.

But generally when you're talking about aircraft and when you're talking in the traffickers' circles, $5,000 a kilo is the normal, plus gas, plus insurance and the like.

Mr. OXLEY. Suffice it to say, that's a lot of money for a relatively uneducated Mexican citizen who crosses the border. It's a fairly substantial reward for that activity. Isn't that safe to say?

Mr. CASH. It's extremely lucrative; yes, sir, that's very safe to say.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Congressman DioGuardi of New York.

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll ask one question. I wasn't here earlier. In an article I read recently, Commissioner von Raab of the Customs Department was quoted as saying, when he was invited to sit down with officials from Mexico, that he does not sit down with mobsters. So it apparently shows his disdain for what's going on in Mexico at the current time.

He also apparently went on a trip, I believe a couple of years ago, to visit one of the officials—I think it was a police official—and he was put up in his villa, obviously well beyond what an official of that stature would be able to afford.

I'm just wondering, Mr. Cash, what is your reaction to that statement by Mr. von Raab? It seems to me that the State Department was kind of unsettled by it, and is that an indication that the State Department doesn't feel as strongly about this as the commissioner who is very close to the situation in Mexico.

Mr. CASH. Well, sir, I really can't comment on what the State Department's theory is. My personal belief is that there——

Mr. DIOGUARDI. Well the Drug Enforcement Administration's position then.

Mr. CASH. The Drug Enforcement Administration certainly is not oblivious of corruption as a factor in Mexico. In all parts of South America and even in the United States, narcotics has a corruptive nature about it. We find corruption in this country as well. We certainly realize it exists, and we have certainly from time to time our own concerns about various individuals in different States and throughout the various countries of the world in which we operate, and we commonly try to work around it, that's the best we can do.

Mr. DioGuardi. I think there's a concern among congressmen, among the public, that the State Department is playing footsie too many times with these foreign governments and is not using the muscle that we have.

Yesterday in an interview, on the present efforts by the Administration dealing with what's happening in Bolivia, I said that we have to use these economic two-by-fours a lot more often, and I think, with Mexico being so close to our border and all the indications that drugs are coming over our border in huge proportions from that country, that we've got to really get tough.

Now, I'm sure that a lot of this has come out in the testimony here this morning, but it just seems to me—and I have to go on record as saying that we must use every weapon in our arsenal. Further, let me state that I think the State Department has lagged far behind what we're doing at all levels in this country to counteract drug abuse.

I find it heartening, finally, to see the Administrations move in Bolivia, although I find it disheartening that it was publicized. I can't imagine how we can have covert operation like that and now try to do it in other countries when we somehow allow information of the operation to leak out. Obviously, the criminals involved in this trade are smart enough to start dismantling the labs.

So I would hope that in the future we could do more to ensure that these operations remain covert and then, when it's successful, announce how successful it has been.

But in any case, I think that the State Department has to take a much heavier hand in using the economic muscle, the money that we funnel into these countries, to get their attention, because the illegal drugs coming into our country are going to kill us. It's in our neighborhoods and schools.

I represent a district just north of New York City. New York City now has been named the crack capital of the world. Westchester County, which is an affluent district just on the northern tier of New York City, has been named by the Drug Enforcement Administration as the county with the highest per capita use of drugs in the country, or at least in the State of New York. That may be because there is more money available to purchase these drugs.

You know, we must try to do all we can in our school through education, but it seems to me the cheapest way to get this choke off this trade is to get it at the source, get it before the farmers let it loose, because when it gets into the networks the costs skyrocket 50 and 100 times. When it gets here, it's another 50 to 100 times higher. You're dealing with money of such huge proportions that almost anybody is corruptible, from what we've seen.

So the State Department has to get involved up front to dry up the source. Certainly we've got to do something at the other end to dry up the market.

Mr. Dion. Sir, I would just like to comment. I think that the State Department is heavily involved and has used a great deal of influence with foreign governments. Unfortunately, generally this is diplomatic persuasion and is not public, and, as you said, it's very unfortunate when one of these operations like Bolivia gets prematurely leaked to the press and effectiveness suffers.

So I think that's one of the things that we're going to have to work to control if we're going to have effective operations against narcotics which have to be cooperative. We have to get the governments of the other countries to go along. So it's important that we keep some lid on the publicity that surrounds operations.

Mr. DioGuardi. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Scheuer. Congressman Guarini.

Mr. Guarini. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Al Smith used to say, "Let's look at the record," and from what I can see, the situation is becoming worse, more crucial than ever, and there is no question that there are purer and cheaper drugs on our streets as a result of what is happening in Mexico, what's coming up through the border.

So I don't think that the State Department can be very proud of the record that it has, frankly, and they should do more. I agree with my colleague that there has been a lot of slippage in the resolve of the State Department.

But let's look at the good faith of what's happened in Mexico in the Camarena case. Can you tell us? It's been a year and a half now—February 1985—since Mr. Camarena was murdered. Can you tell us what results we have had, what justice we have had, in regard to dealing with Mexico and clearing up this case?

Mr. Dion. On the details of the investigation, I would have to defer to Mr. Cash. And on the representations that are being made in a continuing fashion to the Mexican Government, I think the Latin American Affairs Bureau would have to respond.

Mr. Guarini. I don't accept that as an answer. Does the State Department—are they staying on top of the case?

I understand that a lot of the evidence was already burned in the beginning on the clothing; they only took swatches and samples and things of that sort. Has anybody been formally charged with the crime in the year and a half now that the entire Mexican Government had to investigate this case? Have there been any formal charges, and is the State Department satisfied with that result?

Mr. Dion. I would say the State Department is definitely not satisfied with the result.

Mr. Guarini. What are they doing about it?

Mr. Dion. Again, I would have to say that this is being pursued with the Mexican authorities in private diplomatic discussions.

Mr. Guarini. That is not very satisfactory as far as the American people are concerned in seeing that justice is done, because the very corruption we talk about is what keeps this case under wraps. It's just further symptomatic of what's happening down in Mexico, and if there is no person brought to justice, if there is not enough pressure exercised by the State Department, it's only further proof of the problems that exist in Mexico and the ineffectiveness of the State Department in handling the problem.

Mr. Dion. I think that this has been addressed at a very high level in the U.S. Government, by the President himself, by the Attorney General, by the Secretary of State.

Mr. GUARINI. But does that satisfy you, that it's been addressed?

Mr. DION. No, sir.

Mr. GUARINI. All the more reason why you should be embarrassed, all the more reason why there is a shame on the way we've handled the entire case. If it's been addressed by the highest level, then why are we so ineffective? Why are there no results? Do you wish to pursue it?

All right. Thank you. It's an entirely unsatisfactory result, and that's only one situation which more or less is a symbol of what's happening down in Mexico.

Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. Chairman Rangel.

Mr. RANGEL. I passed this public law to you because staff gave it to me and I wanted you to pursue it, but, Mr. Secretary, is it not the law that the Secretary of State should transmit a written report to the Congress of the progress made in the Camarena case, and did they submit such a report?

Mr. DION. My understanding is that that report has been submitted; yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. All right. Mr. Chairman I agree with Mr. Guarini. It's very, very difficult for me to see how we can report on anything without verification, and I don't say this disparagingly with the Government of Mexico, but it's impossible for me to understand how we would accept any figures coming out of this, but we do know that we're getting less cooperation than ever before.

My last statement is that, in view of the fact that you've stated for the record that the narcotics situation in Mexico—narcotics control—is of the highest priority, how would we know that it is of the highest priority, other than your testimony?

Mr. DION. Well, I think that you're going to have to wait to see the results of the five or six separate initiatives that we're pursuing with the Mexicans.

Mr. RANGEL. I see.

I mean you can't direct my attention to any statement made by the President of the United States indicating that this is a high foreign policy priority, could you?

Mr. DION. I think that I could supply for the record indications that the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the President have made numerous statements.

Mr. RANGEL. No, no. Could you direct my attention to any statement made by the President of the United States as to the foreign policy priority of this problem we're having with the Government of Mexico, but to be kind, I would say with any drug producing country, to tell you the truth?

Mr. DION. I don't know if that's a matter of public record, sir, but I know that in all discussions with drug producing countries it's high on the agenda.

Mr. RANGEL. You mentioned the Secretary of State having referred to this. I can't find any record where the Secretary of State has publicly discussed this serious problem that we're having with narcotics. I don't ever recall on the Sunday morning programs or at the United Nations. I do understand from Mr. Hesse that he gave a speech before the last election in Miami to some Cuban-

American business people, and the last time I spoke with Mr. Hesse he said there was one other speech that he is familiar with.

[NOTE.—Three speeches by Secretary Shultz were made part of the hearing record, at Chairman Rangel's request, when he and State officials appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in June, 1985.]

With the exception of those two speeches, do you recall in the last five or six years any statement made by the Secretary of State that would indicate the priority which the State Department gives this very serious issue?

Mr. DION. I think I could supply you examples of references that have been made by very high officials, including the Secretary of State. [See previous Note.]

Mr. RANGEL. I mean could you tell me, just generally speaking, when the Secretary made it or where he made it? I'm saying categorically that he hasn't done it, only so that you would tell me which area to go in to find it.

Mr. DION. Sir, the Secretary of State made a speech last winter in California, in Los Angeles, as I recall.

Mr. RANGEL. Would you ask Mr. Hesse whether that was the same speech that he told me——

Mr. DION. Yes, sir, I think that's the same speech that he referred to.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, I tried to make it clear that I'm giving the Secretary two speeches, and I'm trying to find out whether you would help me as to whether there were any more.

Mr. DION. I'll research that, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. No, it's not for research, it's trying to get some priority.

How long has the vacancy existed for the Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters?

Mr. DION. The position was vacated by Assistant Secretary Jon Thomas at the end of March, and Ann Wrobleski was named——

Mr. RANGEL. What's the difficulty in getting her confirmation?

Mr. DION. I think the confirmation hearing will be held next week, sir. (July 31, 1986)

Mr. RANGEL. Is that, too, a priority with the administration?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir, it has been.

Mr. RANGEL. Okay.

Has Secretary of Defense Weinberger—do you know of any speech he may have given indicating that this narcotics problem is a threat to our national security and his willingness to do what he can in order to assist us in this threat? Do you know of any speech or writings that he may have given any time since he's been Secretary?

Mr. DION. I'd have to defer to the Defense Department.

Mr. RANGEL. I mean as a public official do you remember, you know, whether he—I don't see where it's a foreign policy priority. I mean how about Secretary Bennett? Would you know whether he has any ongoing educational programs he's asking support from the Congress in order to educate the American people as to what a serious threat this narcotics epidemic is? Would you know of anything like that?

Mr. **Dion**. I know he's made several speeches on drugs in the last couple of months.

Mr. **Rangel**. I'm talking about Federal programs. You don't know anything about that?

Mr. **Dion**. No, sir—not about domestic Federal programming.

Mr. **Rangel**. Could you give me the name of any public official, with the exception of Mrs. Nancy Reagan, that's made any public statement so that this Member would believe that this has a high priority in the administration? Could you name anybody?

Mr. **Dion**. Mr. Hesse just gave me a note which says that the President referred to this issue in a press conference on June 3.

Mr. **Rangel**. Was that the "Just say 'no' " conference, Mr. Hesse, with the Advertising Council?

Mr. **Hesse**. No, Mr. Chairman. He was discussing the issue of U.S.-Mexican relations on narcotics to a group of 24 Mexican legislators.

Mr. **Rangel**. I see. But we haven't had any major addresses about this.

You see, I know that casually people discuss the problem, but since the acting deputy secretary had indicated that it had such a high priority, I thought that maybe somebody might have mentioned it publicly. I know that State Department people and the President discuss a lot of things privately, but you can't think of anybody that would show evidence that it's of a very high priority on a Cabinet level?

Mr. **Dion**. Well, sir, I think the Attorney General has referred to it in every one of his press conferences at the conclusion of his law enforcement summit meetings wit Mexico.

Mr. **Rangel**. What jurisdiction does the Attorney General have in dealing with foreign nations? I never understood that. I always thought it was supposed to be Secretary Shultz with the State Department. I understand now that the major negotiator with these countries is the Attorney General, who is in charge of the Justice Department. Is that true?

Mr. **Dion**. Sir, that's not exactly accurate. As the chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, a Cabinet level agency that coordinates narcotics policy within the Government——

Mr. **Rangel**. What foreign policy jurisdiction does our Attorney General have?

Mr. **Dion**. Only coordinative—but, as a presidential envoy and Cabinet Officer he has met frequently with the Attorney General of Mexico on the narcotics and other law enforcement problems in Mexico, and with officials in other countries.

Mr. **Rangel**. So have I, on several occasions, but I don't have any foreign policy jurisdiction.

Mr. **Dion**. The Attorney General has a role as a result of the Organized Crime Law of 1984 which created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, sir.

Mr. **Rangel**. But Secretary Shultz, he doesn't meet with these people.

Mr. **Dion**. Yes, sir, he does, on frequent occasions.

Mr. **Rangel**. He does?

Mr. **Dion**. Absolutely.

Mr. RANGEL. It's been very enlightening. I hope you can go back to your shop and tell them that the Congress would like to have some more real evidence of the priority that the State Department has given this issue, and I appreciate your testimony.

Mr. SCHEUER. Let me just say in closing that you must understand there's a very great degree of unhappiness and frustration and cynicism up here among these Members, on both sides of the aisle, because we have been there. We have had hands-on experience. We have talked to Mexicans; we have talked to American law enforcement officials along the border; we have talked to governors; we have talked to mayors; and at every point in these informal meetings we've heard nothing but discouraging news, that the cooperation isn't there, that the system isn't working, that the borders are absolutely falling apart, any semblance of control, that there's free and easy access to anybody, both people and narcotics, contraband of all kinds, and that the system is virtually moribund, it's virtually inoperative, it isn't working.

So that when we hear a State Department representative use phrases like "extremely effective"—something has been extremely effective, no matter what it was—it tends to rob such a spokesman of any credibility that he might have, because the fact is that nothing that is happening now can be characterized as being extremely effective, because nothing is working, really nothing is working. There are virtually open borders, virtually unimpeded, open access to our markets for Mexican-grown narcotics and narcotics that transit Mexico and come unimpeded into our country.

Mr. DION. Sir, if I used "extremely effective, (pages 12–13)" I was referring only to the measures that we're trying to take——

Mr. SCHEUER. But they aren't extremely effective, and when you use phrases like that, you make us throw up our hands. The English language doesn't mean to you what it means to us. You make us feel that we're like the nine blind men that describe an elephant.

We've had hands-on experience down there, and we think we know what's going on, and when you say that anything connected with our effort with Mexico is extremely effective and very effective—and you used both of those phrases this morning—we simply wonder where you get your information and what kind of a world you're inhabiting.

I don't mean to be offensive, but you have to understand that you're talking to a bunch of working pols who have the capacity to make a hands-on visit, have a hearing in the Southwest, in Mexico, talk to Government officials, both Americans and Mexicans, and come away with a pretty realistic perception of where it's at, and where it's at ain't extremely effective, and it ain't very effective, it's pitiful, it's dismal, it's painful, and we're totally discouraged, and if it's this way now, what's going to happen if the Government of Mexico teeters the wrong way on this precipice on which it's balanced if that social compact begins to collapse, begins to shred, as is happening? You've seen signs of that.

Are you aware of what is happening in the northern states, in Juarez, and so forth, where they have had contests in recent months between the PON and the PRI? How would you describe the citizen reaction to those elections?

Mr. **Dion**. I would say that clearly there are very serious problems along the border, and I never would have——

Mr. **Scheuer**. No, I don't mean along the border, I mean within Mexico, its own citizens rebelling, being at the point of revolt, being at the point of—do you remember that movie with the people leaning out the window and saying, "I'm not going to take any of that stuff any more"? That's what Mexican citizens are saying. After almost 60 years of one-party government, they're not going to take it any more, it seems, and if we have the present degree of totally ineffective cooperation that's nonexistent in any real terms, what's going to happen when that social compact shreds further?

Can I ask you why there has been a delay of several months in naming an ambassador to Mexico to replace Ambassador Gavin when we have so many desperately pressing problems with Mexico?

Mr. **Dion**. I'd have to refer that to the Latin American Bureau, but my understanding is that there is indeed a nominee, whose name will be presented very soon to the Senate.

Mr. **Scheuer**. Let me ask Mr. Cash the last question.

In terms of hands-on experience now, what is happening with our agents down there? We have 32 agents down there.

In other countries where we get cooperation, our agents—there's a sharing between the host country and our agents of vital information of what's happening, of where the processing installations are, of who the traffickers are.

Is this information sharing going on? Are there investigations taking place jointly? Are there arrests? Are there trials? Are there convictions? Are there incarcerations? What's happening down there in terms of hands-on, field experience in investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and convicting drug traffickers and in destroying the network of processing labs?

Mr. **Cash**. There are, Congressman Scheuer, a number of operations such as you describe that are going on in Mexico. There certainly are labs that have been seized, there are cases that have been made, but there are certainly not as many cases made as we would like.

I think that for the various reasons that the committee has addressed, and that are all well known to all of us, this is certainly an impediment.

I think that one of the biggest problems we face in Mexico with the DEA agents at the present time—we are gathering a great deal of intelligence, we are giving a lot of information and sharing a lot of information, but we face in Mexico a problem of continuity that is damaging for our institution building and relationships between agents and their counter parts.

The Mexican law enforcement system, as you know, is not exactly comparable to that of the United States. The organizational aspects of it are not what we have in this country. We are operating with the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, and there have been, in many instances in several of the States, changes in the commandante who is the chief enforcement officer in that particular State.

Mr. **Scheuer**. Let me ask you this question. Do you feel that if there was real will and real leadership at the top, that the Mexican Federal Judicial Police could stop the flow of narcotics drugs, at least on the land, from Mexico to the United States, across our borders?

Mr. CASH. I think they could make a very large contribution to that end; yes, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. A hell of a lot larger than they're making now.

Mr. CASH. It would certainly be within our desire to see that happen.

Mr. SCHEUER. I don't mean desire. Do you think that the Mexican Federal Judicial Police could, if they wanted, virtually staunch the flow of narcotics on that land crossing from Mexico to the United States?

Mr. CASH. I'm not sure that they could stop it; no, sir.

Virtually staunch it? No. I think that they certainly could contribute a lot more to the lessening of that amount that is flowing north in our direction, but I don't believe that they alone could stomp it out, because I think, as in many countries, including our own, the problem has gotten to be quite enormous.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, we certainly can all agree with you on that last statement that the problem has gotten to be quite enormous.

We thank the panel—you've been very patient—and we appreciate the information and the views you've given us.

We will now invite the next panel. There will be a hiatus of about two or three minutes while we set up the table.

Mr. GUARINI [acting chairman]. General, Admirals, and gentlemen, we're going to begin the panel on the border.

I'd like to ask Admiral Paul A. Yost, who I understand has a time problem, commandant, United States Coast Guard, if he will begin his statement.

We welcome you all here, and we appreciate having the benefit of your remarks.

Would you please be good enough to summarize your statement? It will be submitted in the record. We would appreciate it if you would give us the gist of your comments.

TESTIMONY OF ADM. PAUL A. YOST, COMMANDANT, U.S. COAST GUARD, ACCOMPANIED BY REAR ADM. CLYDE ROBBINS

Admiral YOST. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I will try to stay through the end of the hearing.

It's a pleasure to appear before you today to provide an overview of the Coast Guard's role in drug enforcement along the southwest border of the United States.

With your permission, I will summarize my statement.

As you know, I have made drug law enforcement one of my top priorities as the new Commandant of the Coast Guard. There has been a substantial increase in drug smuggling on our southwest border, which is primarily, at least partly, a reaction to the successful multi-agency interdiction efforts in the Caribbean over the last two years.

This same type of cooperative effort, the southwest border initiative, is currently being taken to gain control of the southwest border. To do otherwise would be pointless. Unless all these avenues of drug trafficking are successfully blocked, our interdiction efforts in other areas are to no avail.

The southwest border initiative is primarily focused towards the interdiction of narcotics coming by land or air across the land border with Mexico. However, the U.S. Coast Guard, as the Nation's primary maritime law enforcement agency, has been active in its planning. If the initiative is successful, we expect there will be some spill-over into the maritime trafficking, and we stand ready to interdict these vessels.

Therefore, we will conduct drug interdiction operations in support of the initiative on the high seas in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of Southern California. Coast Guard aircraft will conduct surveillance flights in these areas to assist Coast Guard cutters in locating and identifying vessels carrying contraband en route to the United States.

We also expect to deploy Coast Guard law enforcement teams aboard U.S. Navy ships transiting or operating in these areas as the ships are made available. In addition, Coast Guard small boats at our stations near the U.S.-Mexican border will be available to intercept drug-laden vessels nearer our southern shores.

The very nature of drug trafficking makes it a multi-national venture. It is an international problem that requires the full cooperation of foreign governments in order to stop. To be completely effective, operations along the southwest border will require the full cooperation of Mexico. In our maritime activities, we have been working towards that goal.

We have a good relationship with the Mexican Navy on the unit level. We are making every effort to nurture this high level of cooperation between our units and the local Mexican Navy commanders through continuing port visits and other initiatives. We are also seeking ways to continue to improve our relationship with the Government of Mexico.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be happy to answer any questions you or members of the committee may have.

[The statement of Admiral Yost appears on p. 80.]

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Mr. Cash, deputy assistant administrator for operations of the DEA, would you like to begin your statement concerning the border, sir.

ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY OF THOMAS V. CASH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR OPERATIONS, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

Mr. CASH. Mr. Chairman, the Drug Enforcement Administration is a participant in the southwest border initiative that you're going to hear discussed today. We certainly support it, endorse it, and feel that it's a necessary effort in interdicting the substances that we spoke of earlier in this hearing. We feel that over the long haul such efforts are going to pay off and are going to be worthy of the amount of effort that's being put in by all the agencies.

Primarily, the Drug Enforcement Policy Board has assigned primary responsibility for developing this to the Treasury Department, and we stand ready to support that effort, sir.

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, sir.

Mr. William Rosenblatt, assistant commissioner for enforcement, U.S. Customs Service.

Mr. Rosenblatt.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM ROSENBLATT, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR ENFORCEMENT, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'm delighted to have this opportunity to appear before you today to describe the serious law enforcement challenge that the Customs Service faces along this country's border with Mexico.

As Assistant Commissioner for Enforcement at Customs, I am responsible for coordinating Customs' response to what may be developing into our country's number one drug smuggling threat area.

Mr. Chairman, we are attempting to deal with an increasingly difficult situation at the Mexican border. Mexico is now the number one source of heroin and marijuana entering the United States, and over 30 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United States enters from Mexico.

The crisis on our southwest border is evidenced by growing corruption in Mexico, increased acts of violence on both sides of the border, increased seizures of narcotics, and increased presence of Colombian narco-traffickers and evidence of a huge increase in cash activity within the financial institutions located in U.S. border towns.

Smugglers have been building new landing strips in Mexico less than 100 miles south of our border. They are building warehouses to store vast amounts of drugs. Colombian smugglers are settling along the border, they are buying the services of Mexicans to carry their drugs into the United States. The Colombians are bringing more violence with them.

Mr. Chairman, I'm sure you will recall the vivid images of what southern Florida was like six years ago. Colombian drug smugglers were gunning each other down in crowded shopping centers in broad daylight. They had no regard for human life, and, in their minds, there were no innocent victims.

We are beginning to see many of the same warning signs we saw in south Florida now turning up along our 2,000-mile border with Mexico. Not too long ago, a Customs patrol officer was viciously and with impunity gunned down in Sells, Arizona. Our investigation of that shooting is continuing.

Our southern border has always been open and free, the way most Americans want it. We are not going to erect an iron curtain between ourselves and Mexico, but, Mr. Chairman, we must sound the alarm that our border is being violated at will. Our southern border is indeed fast becoming what southern Florida was like six years ago.

Customs has in recent months responded to this crisis with an assignment of additional trained agents, criminal investigators, narcotics dog handlers, inspectors, and intelligence specialists to priority locations on the southwest border.

At the same time, Customs has given top priority to the hiring of crack fixed-wing and helicopter pilots needed to wage the narcotics air war in the southwest. Customs-enhanced presence on the border along with resources from its sister Federal agencies, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the FBI, will make a difference, as it did in southern Florida four years ago.

However, because of the easy access smugglers have to Mexican territory, one of the most encouraging developments would be for the Mexican law enforcement officials to move forward, shoulder to shoulder with us, against narcotics smuggling interests.

I am aware of high level discussions which hopefully will result in better cooperation between the United States and Mexico. I am sure law abiding citizens on both sides of the border would welcome progress that could be made in that area.

Customs appreciates the concern of the Select Committee regarding the war on drugs. I would be glad to answer any questions you may have on Customs' southwest border operations.

[The statement of Mr. Rosenblatt appears on p. 83.]

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, Mr. Rosenblatt.

Mr. Roger Brandemuehl, assistant commissioner of the Border Patrol, INS.

We welcome you, Mr. Brandemuehl.

TESTIMONY OF ROGER BRANDEMUEHL, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, BORDER PATROL, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Mr. BRANDEMUEHL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It certainly is a privilege to appear before this committee, and I'd like to submit a written statement for the record, then I'd like to briefly summarize that statement.

Mr. GUARINI. Yes, please do. It will be put into the record.

Mr. BRANDEMUEHL. Thank you.

Never before in the history of this Nation have our borders been so severely tested by illegal immigration and drug trafficking. To combat this malady, we have added resources along our southern land border.

Since the beginning of fiscal year 1985, the number of Border Patrol agents on the U.S.-Mexico border has been increased by one-third. We have added and are continuing to add equipment to new technology to increase our effectiveness in the detection and apprehension of illegal aliens.

For the past few years, our apprehension figures have soared at unprecedented levels. Last year, we apprehended a record 1.2 million illegal aliens. This year, we are estimating 1.8 million illegal aliens. That's an increase of 50 percent.

Part of this increase can be attributed to the added resources being applied to the southern border. However, we believe the major reason for the dramatic increase in apprehensions is that a substantially larger flow of people are trying to illegally enter the United States as a result of the continuing socio-economic problems in Mexico, Central, and South America.

Along with the record-setting number of apprehensions of illegal aliens, we are also seizing large amounts of narcotics. Last year, the Patrol effected over 885 narcotics seizures, and this year we're well ahead of that rate.

The Border Patrol has become increasingly involved in the interdiction of drugs along our land border. Our mandate, expertise, and resources are directed at the prevention and detection of persons entering the United States illegally. We are in the people business, and people are bringing narcotics along with them.

The Border Patrol has stepped up its drug interdiction efforts by placing special emphasis along the immediate border area and have Border Patrol checkpoints. This new role is undertaken by the Patrol as part of an overall effort to enhance southwest border coverage. That combines the efforts of Federal, State, and local agencies under the cooperation and coordination of the National Narcotic Border Interdiction System.

We have expanded our training in drug identification and enhanced our intelligence gathering capabilities regarding drug trafficking.

The problem of controlling the border is an extremely difficult and a serious one. We are exploring every possible solution to address the problem. Not only are we joining forces with the other law enforcement agencies but we are working very closely with the military for possible acquisition of vehicles, communications, sensor systems, and other equipment.

As a result of these efforts and added resources, more people and drugs are being stopped at the border, although by no means are we encountering all of them. We need immigration reform legislation to address the illegal alien problem, and we need a total antidrug effort.

I firmly believe that there is now, more than ever before, the need for a national commitment to a visible, strong, and effective border enforcement. To do less will encourage a pervasive attitude for illegal aliens, drug traffickers, and other criminal elements to continue to ignore our laws.

That's the end of my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions.

[The statement of Mr. Brandemuehl appears on p. 87.]

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, Mr. Brandemuehl.

Major General Herbert R. Temple, Junior, USA, director, Army National Guard, National Guard Bureau.

We welcome you, General, and we would appreciate it if you would put your statement into the record and give us the benefit of your remarks.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. HERBERT R. TEMPLE, JR., USA, DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

General TEMPLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to address the Select Committee.

The National Guard is providing support in two statuses. First is State active duty: Essentially the State Government picks up the cost for the National Guard participation in the program; also, under title XXXII of the United States Code, which provides Federally-funded training, which permits us to incidentally participate in the program.

Our National Guard support missions are in three categories. One is observation and reporting during normal training activities, second, is the transportation of law enforcement officials to assist them in the performance of their duties, and, as was previously mentioned, the loan of specialized equipment to assist those agencies involved in drug enforcement.

The National Guard policy on support of drug enforcement operations takes two phases. First, we try to provide the maximum support possible within the constraints of the Department of Defense policies and regulations, and secondly we try to optimize support during scheduled training without a degradation of that training, which is an essential part of the National Guard mission.

The National Guard support in 1983 reflected four States participating in missions. There was a dramatic increase by 1985. Twenty States reported over 207 missions which included 1,764 aerial sorties involving 2,384 flying hours. The results of those missions were in excess of 229,000 marijuana plants either confiscated or eradicated, with a street value of approximately $260 million.

National Guard efforts this calendar year to date: 14 States have reported support missions. One mission in support of the United States Coast Guard netted 40 tons of marijuana. Additionally, the National Guard supported raids of West Coast drug labs, and over 33 States have developed memorandums of understanding and participation with State agencies.

Training of aviators by civil law enforcement agencies has permitted aerial spotting of marijuana fields, and 35 States have received such training.

In order to expand our coordination and cooperation with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, I had the privilege recently to visit both El Paso and San Diego and to be a participant with the United States Border Patrol in observing their activities.

As a result of that, I met with Commissioner Nelson of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and we're actively pursuing those programs which might support his activities. The National Guard will continue to support drug enforcement efforts in every possible way.

Sir, that concludes my statement.

[The statement of General Temple appears on p. 92.]

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, General Temple.

Colonel Harvey G. Pothier, United States Air Force, acting director, Department of Defense Task Force on Drug Enforcement.

Colonel, we would appreciate it if you would summarize your remarks also.

TESTIMONY OF COL. HARVEY G. POTHIER, USAF, ACTING DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT

Colonel POTHIER. I'll be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman. Again, it's a privilege to appear before this committee, having traveled with you in January throughout the Southwest.

Today, I would like to briefly discuss, by way of summary, our role in the national campaign to suppress the flow of illegal drugs.

As you will recall, we are a provider of surveillance information on land, sea, and air drug trafficking. We are also a supplier of information to assist the intelligence effort in foreign countries. In addition, we make available sophisticated equipment to law enforcement authorities.

During my January appearance before this committee in San Diego, I reported on the Defense Department's fiscal year 1985 levels of support. You may recall that in 1985 we responded positively to over 8,000 requests from Federal, State, and local authorities. In addition, we provided over $14 million of aircraft and surface vessel surveillance support incidental to normal operations and training, including over 10,000 flight hours, and we loaned over $100 million in sophisticated equipment to Federal, State, and local law enforcement authorities since we've been involved in supporting this activity.

Mr. Chairman, this year the Defense Department will begin a new program which will clearly represent our most significant contribution to date. The Attorney General recently forwarded to the Congress the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board proposal which accommodates interdiction needs and recommends improvements to several of the critical components of the Government's overall anti-drug effort. The Defense Department's contributions to this proposal will greatly improve this Nation's capability to interdict drug traffickers at or near our borders.

For example, the administration proposal calls for the Navy to loan four state-of-the-art E2C airborne early warning aircraft for use by law enforcement authorities along the southern U.S. tier. In addition, the Air Force will procure five tethered Aerostat radar systems for the Customs Service to operate and maintain along the U.S.-Mexican border, and, as I recall at the outset of this hearing this morning, Congressman Scheuer indicated the need for that low-level coverage along the Mexican border, and we feel this will give us that capability.

Our feeling is that these aircraft and balloon-borne radars will constrain free access for drug-laden aircraft attempting to cross our national borders below the coverage of the ground-based radars, and these radars will provide the improved detection recommended in your report after your visit.

The Air Force will also modify two C130 Hercules aircraft with special sensors for use near the drug production and processing areas. These aircraft, along with the personnel to operate and maintain them, will be assigned to the U.S. Southern Command in Panama.

The multi-service DOD contribution also includes rotary wing helicopter support as a by-product of normal mission and training activity. These Army, Marine, and Air Force helicopter units based along the southern U.S. tier will respond to requests on a case-by-case basis.

I might also mention that the recently signed national security decision directive on narcotics and national security provides emphasis and direction to all Federal departments and agencies participating in the national anti-drug campaign. The directive contains guidance for the Defense Department to endeavor to maximize assistance permitted under Public Law 97-86 particularly in terms of training exercises. Indeed, during the first half of this fiscal year, our aircraft flew over 6,000 hours of surveillance supporting drug interdiction as compared to 10,000 hours during the entire fiscal year 1985.

We have expanded our participation in multi-agency operations coordinated by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, which is headed by the Vice President.

For example, the services expended a combined total of $22 million supporting Hat Trick II, the large inter-agency drug interdiction operation coordinated by the Vice President's staff. The DOD contribution included over $10 million ship steaming costs, approximately $6 million in Navy P3 aircraft flight hour costs, one-half million dollars for deployed Army Black Hawk helicopter operations in the Bahamas and over one million each for Navy E2C and Air Force AWACS surveillance aircraft flight hour costs and various other support activities.

The $22 million expenditure for Hat Trick II is significant when compared to the approximately $14 million service expenditures during fiscal year 1985 which I mentioned at the outset.

We are taking major steps, as everyone is aware now, in countries outside of the U.S. to deal with the problem at its source.

Mr. Chairman, the DOD commitment goes far beyond the provisioning of equipment to the law enforcement community. The Defense Department has transitioned from the role of a passive equipment supplier to being a highly active and vital source of tactical surveillance and intelligence information.

Our goal is to enhance the civilian law enforcement community's ability to make necessary arrests, searches, and seizures. We believe this to be a proper role for the armed forces so that we maintain the traditional separation between military and civilian law enforcement responsibilities. This separation is, I might add, a fundamental principle which is endemic to our American democracy.

I'll be glad to entertain questions.

[The statement of Colonel Pothier appears on p. 97.]

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, Colonel.

This committee has been to the border not very long ago and had hearings along the 2,000-mile border, and of course we have taken the testimony of Mr. von Raab who told us that a governor on the border of Mexico is even growing cocaine. We know that there is pervasive corruption within Mexico. Now you tell us, Mr. Brandemuehl, that we have 1.2 million illegal aliens entering the country from Mexico because of the economic problems, which will grow 50 percent this year, according to our estimates.

We have got a very difficult and painful problem on our border, and we have a neighbor with whom we have had an uncontrolled, unguarded border for many long generations.

Is it a matter of more resources? Is it a matter of futility? What action positively do you think we can effect? Do we have to close and tighten up our border a great deal more than we have? What is your professional opinion?

There are six of you who have jurisdiction. We've got a tremendous amount of fragmented jurisdiction in our drug effort. Do you have any opinions as to whether we should tighten our border up and restrict the flow of drugs and the terrorists, illegal aliens, which we know are poisoning our society here in the United States?

I know you have thrown more effort into it, and I know that there is awareness of the problem, but is it futile unless we close the border down completely? Are there things that we could do that we are not doing that would be more effective in stopping the flow of drugs and illegal aliens into our country?

Is there anybody that wants to—Admiral Yost.

Admiral Yost. I'd be very glad to say something about that—the closing of the borders. Particularly the interdiction of drugs that are being brought in by air is an extremely complicated and difficult problem. It's very asset intensive, which is a fancy way of saying it's very, very expensive. The more money that you spend on it, the more success you are going to have in the interdiction area.

The education area is an area that doesn't come under my cognizance. Neither does the in-country efforts of eradication, and diplomacy is completely outside of my purview. I'm only talking to you about the interdiction in the air and on the sea. They're both very intensive as far as cost and money goes.

I think that when we put dollars towards an effort there, we find that we have success. We did that in the Caribbean for the last two years, and I'm sure that what we're about to do on the southwest border will also be extremely successful. It's also going to be extremely expensive, and the success expense ratio is a very direct one.

Mr. Guarini. I thank you, Admiral.

Let me ask the rest of the panel that same question, and please address yourself as to whether we should tighten or close off our border in order to prevent the problem that we have today in the United States.

Mr. Cash?

Mr. Cash. Mr. Chairman, I would have to concur with Admiral Yost that the expenses involved in closing the border are indeed enormous—closing it not by physically closing it but by interdiction efforts.

I think that one of the things we have to realize is that this is a problem not only for the United States, it's certainly a much larger problem, a global problem, and I think that we also have to realize that while some countries may be as the liquor store, certainly we have the drunks that are the consumers, and this is something that must be addressed in any strategy where the United States and the effectiveness of its narcotics consumption or is going to be addressed. We are going to have to look at the consumers as part of the problem.

Mr. Guarini. Should we tighten the border considerably more than what we have done?

Mr. Cash. I think that there are many efforts that have been made, sir, but there is always more that could be done, and certainly if you do tighten it up, it's going to be a lot more difficult to get through. But that's really within the purview of my colleague, Mr. Rosenblatt, who has more experience on the border than I do.

Mr. **Guarini**. Mr. Rosenblatt, the U.S. Customs people have told us that it's not a matter of picking up people, arresting them, and bringing them back; they have two million people that attempt every year to come across, and there's a general futility in the mind set of the U.S. Customs Service along the border as to whether or not we're really able to control this problem unless we close off our borders. Can you give me your opinion?

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. I'd be glad to, Mr. Chairman.

I think it's a question of balance. If we close our border relative to the narcotics problem, then the economic or the commercial traffic between us and Mexico is going to be affected.

If we are talking about tightening our borders in a sporadic fashion based on intelligence at the ports of entry, we would have to do something similar between the ports of entry because a large portion of that border, as you well know, is very desolate.

I believe that we have to persuade our Mexican neighbors to cooperate with us more fully in this effort. We are looking at things, and we have progressed over the years, on doing things in a smarter way. We now know that at our ports of entry a substantial quantity of narcotics are coming at us in what we call commercial traffic.

Starting last year, we put an additional 87 inspectors, and have recently assigned 20 more inspectors along and 20 dog handlers to our Southwest border offices.

Mr. **Guarini**. If you would let me interrupt for a moment, I saw long lines of traffic at the border, huge trucks of produce. It would be physically impossible to examine all the trucks and produce that come across the border.

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. You are absolutely correct.

We have to build upon our selectivity criteria and profiling through better intelligence.

I think one of the keys in our border operations is improved intelligence.

Mr. **Guarini**. Are you getting the cooperation from Mexico in regard to border intelligence? Are we placing enough pressure on Mexico to get that cooperation from them?

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. To answer your first question, we are not getting that kind of information from the Mexican authorities. We rely on our own resources and also the information that we get from our sister agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration. I believe a lot more can be done in that area.

I think we have to refine our intelligence requirements yearly, if not more often, in a united fashion among the various agencies that are assigned to the border. It's not just Customs, and INS, and the Coast Guard, and DEA, but all of us collectively, and that's one of the reasons that the southwest border initiative that has been alluded to today is just one of those things that we can do in a concerted effort both from an intelligence standpoint and also from a direct enforcement interdiction standpoint. Followed up by very aggressive investigation and prosecution.

Mr. **Guarini**. Now where will the funding and resources come from for this initiative?

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. Are you asking me?

Mr. **Guarini**. Yes.

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. Right now, we are attempting to do what we can within our current allocation of resources.

Mr. **Guarini**. Well, are you taking it from other borders in order to shift your personnel down to the Mexican border?

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. No, we are not.

We are assigning additional personnel on the Southwest border as a result of a recent supplemental.

Commissioner von Raab just recently allocated up to 200 positions for the southwest border. This includes inspectors, special agents, criminal investigators, dog handlers, and intelligence specialists.

Mr. **Guarini**. So you are regrouping yourselves, but there's no new funding, no resources or additional monies that are being placed into this war against drugs.

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. That's correct.

Mr. **Guarini**. That's unfortunate.

Do you think the State Department has adequately put pressure on the Mexican Government to get the cooperation we need? Or would you rather refrain from answering that? Do you think there is more we could do?

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. Yes, exactly. You took the words right out of my mouth.

Mr. **Guarini**. All right. Thank you.

Does anybody else want to answer those questions, because then I'd pass it on to—yes, the Border Patrol.

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to address it from the immigration standpoint.

Tighten up the border, yes; close it off, probably no.

From our standpoint, we think there are several things that can be done. Number one, of course, is immigration reform.

This country has to address the multitudes that are coming across our border now. I don't think that we can exist in our present fashion here too much longer by allowing this many people to come across illegally and permeate the U.S. I think something has to be done, and it probably can be done through immigration reform.

Our primary effort in that field would be employer sanctions. We must take the magnet away from the people coming across to seek employment, and that would reduce, we feel, the volume considerably.

We also need additional resources on the border. I think all agencies could utilize that.

I think if we could get immigration reform we could go a long way to start slowing the volume down coming across the border.

Mr. **Guarini**. Should there be more tightening and more personnel put on the border?

Should the military get more involved in tightening the border?

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. Well, I think from our standpoint the military is supporting us with equipment and I think maybe in support roles. We do not think that the military should be placed right on the border.

We go through a very extensive training posture, and I don't think that—we certainly can use them in support roles but I don't believe on the front lines down there at this time.

Mr. **Guarini**. Are you getting cooperation in the INS from the Mexican border at all?

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. Yes, we have several initiatives.

Mr. **Guarini**. I ask you that because in the morning they assemble, and they come over, and you apprehend half of them, and then they go back, and the coyotes are still making a great deal of money and being able to get illegal aliens smuggled into our country. Yet you testified that we were going to go from 1.2 to 1.8 million illegal aliens this year. That's 600,000 more, and the situation isn't getting better, it's exacerbated, and it's getting worse.

So the answers that you give are logical, but is that enough? Should more be done? Is there a futility in your profession in the INS seeing what is happening on the border? Is there something stronger that must be done by our Government?

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. Well, we're certainly frustrated with the problem.

I entered into the Service in 1956 when we had control over our borders, and I've seen what I call the creep effect over the years, especially in the last few years, and again going back to the conditions south of the border.

Not only are we experiencing people from Mexico and Central and South America, but we are also experiencing people from the rest of the world. Last year, we apprehended 80 different nationalities coming across the southern land border, so that's very disturbing in itself.

But, again, I believe, from our standpoint, immigration reform would go a long way in giving us some tools to address the problem.

Mr. **Guarini**. All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. Hunter.

Mr. **Hunter**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Pothier, let me ask you a question about the proposal in the proposed package that DOD would be presenting and is presenting to Congress right now.

As I understand it—let me get right to the point—to take down drug aircraft coming across, you need really three elements: You need an acquisition element, which could be an E2C AWACS type airplane that sees it on its radar coming across, you need a chase element—that is, a chase airplane that the E2C hands off to—and, finally, you need to have that Black Hawk helicopter loaded with armed Customs agents landing in front of this small aircraft as it taxis to a stop at a remote airstrip, with people getting out and making the arrests. So you need the three elements—the acquisition, chase, and apprehension.

Now I put some language in the defense bill last year in the Armed Services markup and in the full House that requested that E2C's be used and we run another test with them and we use them on the border, and we did that.

I haven't received a report yet, but I did talk to General Tice, and the upshot of the thing is, we didn't catch anybody. I think the reason we didn't catch anybody goes to a policy we have, and that's a policy that turns on your interpretation or DOD interpretation of posse comitatus, and that is to the effect that the E2C aircraft, while they get up and they check their time cards in and they spend their time patrolling the border, and they do see aircraft entering the U.S. from Mexico, they don't pursue those aircraft on the basis that that would be going beyond mere surveillance and would be entering the arrest phase of the program, which is prohibited under posse comitatus.

Because of that, if the Customs people don't have a chase plane to hand off to—let's say you're up there in your E2C and you see some planes coming across. If Customs doesn't have some people up at that time—if they don't have any Citation aircraft, for example, which are, I think, our most effective chase aircraft with the F16 radar—then that's too bad; we simply put them down on the time card and they're duly noted in the report, but they're not chased.

Now my problem with this is simply, as I understand it, we never force any planes down anyway. The way we get these planes, we don't put our wing tips on them and force them to the ground; what we do is, we follow them surreptitiously generally—they don't know they are being followed—and when they land at a remote airstrip, we vector in a Black Hawk helicopter to make an arrest.

So it would not seem to me that you are violating posse comitatus if, in the cases where you don't have any chase planes by Customs available, you don't have any Citations that can get up and follow these guys to the airstrips where they are landing, it would seem within the parameters of posse comitatus that the DOD plane, after seeing the airplane coming in, acquiring it on its radar, could follow it, because, after all, you are not arresting them, you're not forcing them down, you're really continuing your surveillance of them until they get to that remote airstrip where they are going to land, and at that time vector in the Customs helicopter so that they can make the apprehension.

If we don't do that, we have a very limited number of Customs assets, and in talking with our Customs people in California—and I have the whole California-Mexican border in my district—we have very few Citations available—these are the chase planes that you hand off to—and they are rarely available, as I understand, when you are undergoing your training missions. So it's not a surprise when we get back the report that the E2C aircraft were up there spending—what?—$2,600 an hour of the taxpayers' money without making any apprehensions whatsoever, because there is no policeman, essentially, once you see the bad guy coming out of the liquor shop—there's no policeman to hand off to.

The second part of my question would go to the necessity for DOD to acquire some Citation II aircraft, and that is that I put two Citation aircraft into the Armed Services procurement markup this year. We had some resistance from DOD. They called back, and although the Citation II's have been very effective, as you know, in bringing down narcotics aircraft, they don't like the idea of having something being put into the DOD markup that isn't directly applicable to our national security needs in the classic sense. So they didn't like that idea.

But, anyway, they are in there, and I'd like for you folks to come up with a statement on whether or not those aircraft and others like them would help us to interdict narcotics more effectively.

Right now, my understanding is that for the last four or five years—this is kind of embarrassing—we have not pursued and brought to earth a single aircraft with narcotics in the State of California with this team or this combination of acquisition aircraft, chase aircraft, and ultimately arrest aircraft, or the Black Hawk helicopter, being utilized.

That's not to say that we don't have intelligence that comes to us and tells us that a drug plane is going to land at 11:05 at a certain airfield, and we get out there, and we make the arrest when they come in. But as far as acquiring and pursuing these aircraft goes, we haven't been successful, and I think we have to do a few things, we have to make a few adjustments, to be successful.

Now the same thing goes with OV10 aircraft. Those are the Marine aircraft. We get them up there, and, as I understand, it's not the policy—once the OV10 sees the drug aircraft coming in, it's not their policy to pursue that aircraft to its landing strip.

So once again, like the E2C, the Navy aircraft, unless you have a Customs agent to hand off to, you're out of luck, and we simply check our timecards in, we write down how many aircraft we saw bringing drugs into this country, and we go back to the base.

So I think there are a few things we need to do, and I'd like to work with you, if I could in these areas, because I think they are pretty important.

General Temple, let me compliment you for coming out, sitting down with our Border Patrol people and our Customs people and saying, "What do you need to help make your operations more successful?"

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to report to the committee that General Temple has been out, has made an evaluation, and is coming up with some recommendations right now, and they're on top of the situation, and our Border Patrol was very candid and forthright, and so were our Customs people, in coming up with some requests, some things that they need fairly desperately that can be provided.

Let me just say, lastly, Mr. Chairman, I think the committee has done a tremendous service in bringing the administration players up here so, as a team, they can be questioned and hear our comments and positions. But I think that this witness list shouldn't stop here. I think at this witness table we should have the Speaker of the House, Mr. O'Neill; we should have Mr. Rodino of Judiciary; we should have Mr. Hughes, of one of the key Judiciary subcommittees; and we should have Mr. Conyers; and I think they should sit here and tell us why we have not had that other element of combatting this important drug problem, and that's the element of strong deterrent-oriented narcotics legislation, mandatory penalities, long-term imprisonments for people who are bringing narcotics across, and all the other things that are very important.

I'm also reminded that when the Senate passed last year the omnibus crime bill 91–1, with the concurrence of people like Strom Thurmond and Ted Kennedy, that bill came over here, and the statement was made to the effect, by one of our chairmen in Judiciary, that the bill was "dead on arrival."

I'm also reminded that the only way we got this thing passed was by putting it on the continuing resolution in 1984, and we had 60 Members of Congress who voted against even bringing up the omnibus crime bill, and yet when it was brought up 6 hours later, in the afternoon, when it did get through, those same Members of Congress voted for it.

So I think we have provided a real service in bringing the administration up, and, by gosh, I think that the idea that the State Department has not addressed this problem and does not have the right priorities is absolutely true. They don't, and they are not using the leverage that they possess, and I think in some cases they are frustrating the President of the United States, but I have to say precisely the same thing for some of my colleagues in the House of Representatives. We have been part of the problem also, and I'd like to get some answers to my letters when my bills come up that call for mandatory penalties, and when I have almost 100 cosponsors on some of these bills and other Members have just as many, when we put in letters saying, "Can we even get hearings on tough anti-drug bills," we get back letters that say, "Maybe some time next year." I think we ought to move this stuff, and I think the Speaker of the House ought to tell us what he is going to do to bring this tough legislation up.

Strong letter to follow, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GUARINI. Well, your point is made, and I think that you should add to your point the fact that we have a bill in for some time now asking for adequate funds and resources of $750 million to be given to State and local governments over a period of five years so they can better enforce laws that we have in our country, and that we fight the demand side of the problem by having your President go along with a bill of $300 million or $100 million over a three-year period whereby we would be able to raise from the $3 million of an $18 billion education budget a more significant fund for education of our people in our country, particularly our young people, and perhaps while you are at it, at the same time, Mr. Hunter, you might be able to ask the President if he will go along with a White House conference on drug abuse, which was proposed by Chairman Rodino not very long ago, which we have not heard from to date.

So I think that there is plenty of blame to share.

Mr. HUNTER. I concur, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GUARINI. And the President has not exercised the leadership, because, as I remember, there was a former President that said, "The buck stops here," and there's no question about it.

So rather than be defensive on the part of the administration, I think we should look at the broad picture and say, "Mr. President, there are additional things that you can do for law enforcement, for drug education, and to bring together a national strategy which is absent in this country today."

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond, I concur with you completely in that I don't think we should be defensive about any of these elements. I don't think we should defend the State Department for their lack of leverage, I don't think we should defend the administration for not putting enough money in the people side of the problem, and I don't think we should defend Congress for not coming up with the tough anti-drug legislation that comprises the deterrent dimensions.

Mr. GUARINI. But to single out Tip O'Neill, to single out Chairman Rodino, I think, is basically unfair, because it becomes partisan, and one thing this committee has always tried to do is to address the drug problem on a bipartisan basis. We will never be successful in this country unless we work together as a team.

Mr. HUNTER. Well, I will join you in criticizing this administration and this Republican State Department and the President of the United States, who I think is a Republican, if you will join me in criticizing the people who happen to be in positions of power in this country.

Mr. GUARINI. Well, I appreciate the recognition.

Mr. HUNTER. Legislation doesn't come to the House floor because Duncan Hunter asks for it to come, it comes because Mr. O'Neill wants to move it, and that's a fact of life.

Mr. GUARINI. Well, we are going to work together in a cooperative sense.

Mr. HUNTER. Precisely.

Mr. GUARINI. And I wish that you would write the President and tell him how strongly you feel about your bills and about how strongly we all feel about getting the proper funding and resources so that we can fight this problem.

Mr. HUNTER. Fine.

Mr. GUARINI. Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I get the impression from the testimony on the border that, first of all, it's unrealistic to close down the border, probably impossible to make a substantial dent in this problem by that means, but that, secondly, intelligence is a key feature of our being able to target in on the actual trafficking.

You have also impressed me with the fact that it appears that the key to adequate intelligence is cooperation from, in this instance, Mexico, cooperation which apparently is not forthcoming, probably due to corruption.

My question, therefore, of Major General Temple and Colonel Pothier, is, what is the prospect of our providing unilaterally the kind of intelligence needed to zero in on those who are, in fact, crossing the border with narcotics?

Colonel POTHIER. If I may, I think the prospects are excellent.

Last year, the Secretary of Defense forwarded to the Drug Enforcement Policy Board a list of 16 initiatives, two-thirds of which focused on more Department of Defense intelligence support for civil law enforcement agencies.

We mentioned Hat Trick II, the large-scale operation that took place between October and the end of February of this year, where we energized the intelligence community to provide that flow of information which would help us. We are continuing that process.

One of the suggestions was to develop an all-source intelligence center, and I'm not at liberty to discuss all the details this morning, but I can assure you that that concept has been approved by the Policy Board. It will give us more visibility into not only the flow of information from Mexico but other countries, drug production countries and the like.

I think by analogy the value of intelligence—it has been expressed in the past that perhaps we need to put a radar curtain around the U.S. and then we have the Department be responsive to react to suspect drugger aircraft, for example. Our point is that, without intelligence, you have got to intercept every one of those, because you don't know which one is carrying the drugs, so to speak.

So if you take that thesis, then I think the next logical step is that, with the improved intelligence, we can maximize the application of the reactor forces which properly belong to Customs, Coast Guard, the DEA, and the like, so that they can be more effective in enforcing the laws along the border, and so, to summarize, we have some initiatives under way, and we feel this is key to the whole process.

General **Temple**. We do not have an institutionalized intelligence apparatus; it's not appropriate for the National Guard to have that.

However, if you want to address intelligence in the broader sense, since our visit to the border with Congressman Hunter we have already begun a program which we believe will provide an especially equipped kind of aircraft with radar, aerial radar, to assist the Border Patrol in the illegal alien aspect of the effort. That's ongoing now. I can't discuss it publicly with you, but be assured that we have already begun that.

Mr. **Fauntroy**. It is reassuring that DOD is beginning to apply its considerable intelligence capabilities to this problem. It certainly appears to me that, in light of our military assistance in Bolivia, we are not going to be able to be of much help unless we have independent intelligence.

For that reason, I'd just like for you to answer one question relative to Mr. Rosenblatt's presentation—namely, the obviously increased activity of Colombian narcotics traffickers in the Mexico scene. To what extent are we providing the kind of intelligence that would enable us to deal with this obviously potentially more violent type of threat?

Mr. Rosenblatt.

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. It's interesting you mention that, Congressman, and I believe that the DEA representative, my colleague Tom Cash, can more appropriately answer that, because I have discussed it with Dave Westrate, my counterpart in DEA, insofar as intelligence requirement for customs, and they identify it as an intelligence requirements for their agency as well. So I'll refer that to Mr. Cash.

Mr. **Cash**. Thank you, Bill.

Congressman Fauntroy, the Drug Enforcement Administration is acutely aware of exactly the issue that you address.

Intelligence is gathered largely through investigations. In fact, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the investigations that we do in the 43 countries around the world where we are stationed largely are the source of the intelligence data that we have on these trends in the traffic. This is something that is documented through investigative activity, certainly not speculation. But there is much additional that can be done.

The Customs Service has personnel stationed with the Drug Enforcement Administration in key countries, Mexico being one of them, so that we can more rapidly convey all of the information that comes to our attention concerning the narcotics traffickers and trends.

I think that intelligence needs to be clarified, and that it is the magnitude that we are dealing with—and that's the concern—certainly we have a lot of intelligence and investigative activity intelligence that we pass to the Customs Service through the El Paso Intelligence Center and other networks.

But when you are speaking of claims and narcotics shipments numbering in the thousands, you certainly have a very formidable job, and every possible technique and every possible tool that DOD or our fellow agencies have and can utilize must be utilized in this collection effort as well as the dissemination effort.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Do we have a DEA person here? Oh, yes.

Mr. Cash, to what extent is there interface between the DEA's intelligence apparatus and that of our Central Intelligence Agency that is out there in the world?

Mr. CASH. Well, the intelligence—all the agencies of the Federal Government, including the Central Intelligence Agencies, work in those respective missions to identify the available information that they come across in their normal course of duty, and, in addition to that, the intelligence agencies of the United States have been mandated by their various chiefs to collect intelligence on drug-related activities.

So there is, in fact, a participation by all of the intelligence agencies who have been brought into this effort that we are facing, not only on the southwest border but in the other areas of the world as well.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GUARINI. Let me ask Admiral Yost, if I may, the Coast Guard has a large fleet at sea and also has an air arm, and I wonder whether or not the Coast Guard itself could more effectively play a large role in regard to air detection.

Could you, Admiral Yost, indicate to the committee whether or not the Coast Guard could assume additional responsibility and what resources they would need to do the job more effectively?

Admiral YOST. The Coast Guard operates more aircraft than I think any other agency in this country outside of the Department of Defense. We do have a large number of—let me say, a substantial inventory of long and medium-range aircraft that regularly fly maritime search and surveillance missions. We used these aircraft extensively in Winter Operations, which were the Coast Guard's major piece of Hat Trick II in the Caribbean and the year before Wagon Wheel in the Caribbean.

Mr. GUARINI. And all your pilots are Navy trained.

Admiral YOST. All our pilots go through Navy flight school, with the exception of a few Air Force pilots that we get directly from direct commissioning, but they all go through military flight schools.

We also have an extensive operations and logistics infrastructure. We have long experience in maritime search and we have the capability for continuous, around-the-clock operations as well as logistics support.

I would sum it up by saying that the Coast Guard is best suited in flying any type of military aircraft and to maintain them, operate them, on an around-the-clock basis.

Now our aircraft are designed for surface search. That is, we look at what is on the surface of the ocean. They do not have a lookout capability, as far as radars or sensors, to see smuggling-type aircraft. Our present aircraft would have to be equipped with that capability. We are looking into that. If we are going to be out there flying on surface search, it makes sense from the same platform to have something that looks out as well as looks down. That's a possibility, and we're looking at it.

Mr. GUARINI. So with additional resources you could be more effective in the air.

Admiral YOST. The better your sensors are on any aircraft, the better that platform is. What I am saying is, we are flying a large inventory of medium-range, long-range military-type aircraft with the infrastructure and the command and control. They just do not have the sensors for air-to-air surveillance.

Mr. GUARINI. When your vessel suspects a ship with illegal drugs on the high seas, do you get the cooperation from Mexico if the ship flees into Mexican waters?

Admiral YOST. We have gotten a lot of cooperation with the Mexican Navy on a unit-by-unit basis, and when we have found vessels that were obviously druggers who escaped by going into the Mexican territorial sea and we have been able to contact a Mexican naval unit, or, in one case, Mexico City and came back down to a Mexican naval unit, the Mexican Navy has taken extremely effective, extremely prompt action.

I get the feeling that the drugger would then like to head back to sea. He doesn't want to be captured by the Mexican Navy; he would much rather be captured by our forces than the Mexican Navy, which indicates the effectiveness of that navy on a unit-by-unit basis doing the kind of thing that they have done and we have asked them to do.

Mr. GUARINI. Where do you stop when you pursue a ship in hot pursuit? Do you stop right at the international water line and then relay the information on to the Mexican Navy? Do you depend on them being there and being able to pick up your hot pursuit?

Admiral YOST. Yes. We would not go into the territorial sea of Mexico or any other sovereign country in pursuit unless we had permission of that country.

Now we have found with Mexico that, if we can, it's much easier to notify local Mexican Navy command, one that we have probably done some ground work and had port calls with our various ships and made personal contacts—go into that command directly through communications and say, "We have one; he's coming into your waters; can you help us?" We have found, on several occasions, extremely effective, prompt action.

Mr. GUARINI. How do you know there is follow-up? They may have prompt action, but do you know of any of these cases that they follow through to criminal prosecution and that the law enforcement end is effective on the other side? Or is your knowledge limited to the hot pursuit?

Admiral YOST. I know that the Mexican Navy comes out and immediately seizes the vessel and takes it in. Now I personally don't know what has happened.

I have my chief of operations with me, Admiral Clyde Robbins.

Clyde, do you know? Do we have any evidence of what they have done with these people?

Admiral ROBBINS. The evidence is a little weak, but the indications are—and we have asked DEA to follow up on these cases that we have, and the evidence is that they are dealt with quite harshly in the Mexican Government.

Mr. GUARINI. But do you have any verification of that, or is it just what you are told? Do you know what happens to the cargo and to the vessel itself? Is there any followthrough or any intelligence we have concerning the followthrough?

Admiral ROBBINS. I think Tom Cash might answer that.

Mr. CASH. These particular cases, Congressman Guarini, are turned over to the military authorities, and there are—of all the information that we have gotten back on the cases, I could give you something for the record, if that is of great interest, but they, in fact, are prosecuted when the military seems to bring them in.

Mr. GUARINI. You see, we are not getting any satisfaction on Camarena. Why should we believe there is any other satisfaction that is being given to the United States concerning law enforcement in any other areas?

Mr. CASH. Well, these particular types of cases, to my knowledge, have been prosecuted, and, as Admiral Robbins said, they have handed out some rather severe sentences in the smuggling type cases.

Mr. GUARINI. Now in regard to hot pursuit, they don't allow us to enter and pursue an air vessel or a ship at sea, do they?

Admiral YOST. We have the mechanism to go through our State Department to the Government of Mexico and ask their cooperation and permission to pursue, to seize, and those kinds of things. They are not one of our leading countries in that kind of cooperation. They are nowhere near as fast, or as good, or as steady as Colombia, or Panama, or Jamaica, or a number of others; Great Britain we have a treaty with.

Mr. GUARINI. But we have no right of hot pursuit, nor do they allow us hot pursuit either in their waters or at the border on land. Is that correct?

Admiral YOST. That is correct. We have no authority to do that.

Mr. GUARINI. Do they stop us? Are they jealous of their sovereign jurisdiction where they say, "You cannot come in," and therefore people get away?

Admiral YOST. I think it is fair to say that Mexico is as much aware of their sovereignty as any country in the world. They are very, very concerned about that, for whatever reason.

Mr. GUARINI. Do we have the right, Mr. Cash, in hot pursuit in other areas of the world where the countries are more cooperative with us than Mexico?

Mr. CASH. Not that I'm aware of, Congressman Guarini, except in certain operations such as Hat Trick II, when Admiral Robbins and I were down in the countries in preparation for a particular operation, and then through agreement, some prior notifications, we did have hot pursuit as a possibility in Colombia and Venezuela and other areas of that particular operation.

But as a general statement, I know of no place where we are allowed hot pursuit without a prior arrangement or a treaty.

Admiral YOST. Could I enlarge on that a little bit?

Mr. GUARINI. Yes, Admiral.

Admiral YOST. In winter operations in Colombia, which was the Coast Guard part of Hat Trick II, we did a lot of spade work with the Colombian Navy as well as the higher levels of the Colombian Government.

One of the things that the Colombians agreed to do was to put a Colombian naval officer on a Coast Guard vessel. That Colombian naval officer had the permission, the authority, of the President of Colombia to allow that Coast Guard cutter to do certain things, including seizing vessels, et cetera—Colombian flag vessels. So we had it right there. We didn't have to go to Colombia. We had the resident young man with us.

We have tried to do that with the Mexican Navy and get them to ride with us. We have not been as successful working with the Mexican Government in any of those things—I'm talking about the Coast Guard now; I'm speaking just to Coast Guard—as we have in other countries. Mexico has been very tough.

Now we are working on that. We are trying to get closer cooperation. We are working with the Mexican Navy in trying to get higher in the organization.

Clyde Robbins, my Chief of Operations behind me, spent some time with the new Mexican Navy chief of naval operations by the name of Admiral Selesky—is that right?

Admiral ROBBINS. Yes, sir.

Admiral YOST. So we are trying to work up to a better relationship there. We don't have it now, it would be fair to say.

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you.

Admiral, Public Law 99-145, the Defense Department Authorization Act this year, requires $15 million be transferred from the Department of the Navy to the Secretary of Transportation to pay for the cost of placing 500 additional Coast Guard personnel trained in drug interdiction on Navy ships. Our understanding is that these funds have not been released. Could you elaborate on that, sir?

Admiral YOST. I think the funds have been released. But whether the funds have been released or not, we are proceeding along with that program. That program is well along, and we would expect to have those 500 people recruited, trained, promoted, and operational, all 500, by 1988. We have got over half of them in place now and operating. That, I think, is a pretty good record.

Mr. GUARINI. On Navy ships you have half of the 500 personnel today operating?

Admiral YOST. Well, when you say on Navy ships, yes. What we are doing is, we are providing a team of people, and these people then, in small teams, are allocated to Navy vessels for specific voyages.

Mr. GUARINI. How many do you have on Navy vessels as of now?

Admiral YOST. As of today, I wouldn't know how many are at sea. What I am saying is, we have got about 300 that are being trained now, today, to be placed on Navy vessels when the Navy vessel is on patrol.

Mr. GUARINI. Well, now, we have authorized this money in the Defense Appropriations Act of 1986. Now you say you have that $15 million and you are spending that for drug—interdiction?

Admiral YOST. Yes. We are spending that to recruit, train, arm, and place these people on Navy vessels as TACLETS.

Mr. GUARINI. Have you spent the $15 million that you are given, or have you spent only a small part of it?

Admiral YOST. No. We have spent a great part of it. It's FY 1986 money. The money goes away after FY 1986. It's my great hope, that in FY 1987 there will be some money. Right now, there's no money available in FY 1987. We have 500 billets authorized. There's no money that I have seen in the Department of Defense budget, and I would hope that you don't leave us with that big bag in 1987 that I have to fill from other places.

Mr. GUARINI. Well, you have made a request for it?

Admiral YOST. Sir?

Mr. GUARINI. You have made a request for it?

Admiral YOST. That money was never in our budget, sir; that was in the DOD budget, and I'm not able to make a request for it. That money, by the way, was transferred to us from the Department of Defense in a very timely manner in March, and we are putting it to good use. Follow it up, sir.

Mr. GUARINI. All right. Thank you.

Just lastly, let me ask one question. Six of your agencies sit at the table today. Do we have a unified border strategy? Are we addressing the problem piecemeal, or have we coordinated our efforts, working together, under a national policy or a national strategy for our border? Could you answer that, Admiral?

Admiral YOST. Well, there has been a lot of debate on that, as you know, sir. This committee, in 1983, took a considerable amount of testimony on that very point, and I'm sure that it can be argued either way.

Mr. GUARINI. Do you have full input into decisions that are made in regard to the strategy of our Border Patrol?

Admiral YOST. Of our Border Patrol? No.

Mr. GUARINI. Of our border efforts.

Admiral YOST. My Secretary sits on the Drug Policy Board chaired by Mr. Meese, as does the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Treasury, et cetera. That board is, in fact, making policy. I'm a policy executor. I can tell you, I'm getting policy down from that board that requires me to support.

One of the things that I'm supporting is this Southwest Interdiction Operation. I'm a small player in that. The last two years, I was a major player in the southeast operation, which was an operation that not only was I a major player in, I had a most significant role in planning it.

Mr. GUARINI. Are we fully utilizing your expertise?

Admiral YOST. I think we're fully utilizing the expertise of the United States Coast Guard. I pointed out some areas in maritime air interdiction that I think, with some effort, we could be utilized a little better.

But in Southwest, it is not a major Coast Guard problem, that's a land bridge problem. I shouldn't have a major role in that. I would look to Customs and DEA to take the lead in that, which they are, and they come to me and say, "Here's what we need to support us," and I'm doing that under the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System run by the Vice President.

One might argue that all could be organized in a different way, and I wouldn't argue one way or the other. It is working now the way it is, and I'm satisfied with it.

Mr. GUARINI. But do we have a national policy, a national strategy? Are you satisfied that we have a national strategy concerning our border problem?

Admiral YOST. Well, the national policy we certainly have. Strategy is in the eye of the beholder. I have a strategy within the Coast Guard that fits within the Policy Board's direction.

Mr. GUARINI. All right. Who was the coordinating factor of this strategy? How is it being coordinated? Is it Mr. Meese? Is it Mr. Turner?

Admiral YOST. No, not Carlton Turner.

Mr. GUARINI. How is it being operated so that we know that all the expertise that we have at the table is being fully utilized and that we are getting the maximum use of our energies and our resources?

Admiral YOST. That's the responsibility of the Policy Board, headed up by Mr. Meese.

Mr. GUARINI. So Mr. Meese is really the one calling the shots.

Admiral YOST. I think Mr. Meese is the one that is setting the strategy, and the Vice President is certainly looking at this very carefully and getting reports. So he is very deeply involved there.

Mr. GUARINI. Of course, Mr. Meese has many jurisdictional areas——

Admiral YOST. Yes, I'd say he's got a plateful.

Mr. GUARINI. With the administration of criminal and civil justice and everything else——

Admiral YOST. Yes.

Mr. GUARINI [continuing]. This has to be 1 percent of all the subject matters that he has to cover, I assume, with the SEC and the FCC and the FTC and everything else.

Admiral YOST. I guess I was surprised—I've only been in this job for six weeks, so I'm not an expert yet, it will take another week or two, but I guess I was surprised that the one Policy Board that I was invited to, not only was Ed Meese there, chairing it and taking a very definite hand in a directive sort of way in it, but so were the secretaries from several other departments. I think it was getting very high level attention.

Now the quality of it, you will have to judge. I think it's good.

Mr. GUARINI. If this is our highest national priority or one of our domestic highest national priorities, then I wonder whether or not a person with so many hats as the Attorney General has to wear, that he could give his full energies and his full thought and expertise to the problem.

It seems to me that, although it may be very noble for him to be as concerned as he is—and I'm sure there is a grave concern—I just question whether or not, when you're fighting the $100 billion illegal operation that is poisoning millions of our young people in our country, that a part-time effort would be sufficient to develop the kind of strategy and offensive that we need to wipe out this drug scourge.

Admiral YOST. Well, I think it's a fair question. He's certainly not doing it by himself. Everybody at this table or their boss also belongs to the coordinating group that works for Meese on something more than a part-time basis. I have a responsibility on that coordinating group.

Mr. Guarini. But you are full-time basis, everybody at the table is full-time basis, and your responsibility is probably a lot less jurisdictionally than Mr. Meese's.

Admiral Yost. That's right. Drugs are one of my top priorities, but I've also got search and rescue and 101 other things on my plate as well. But drugs are one of my top priorities, and I think that's where the administration is.

Mr. Guarini. Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. If the chairman would yield a minute, I'd like to rephrase the question.

I get the impression that you act in response to policy and strategy directives that come from the board. Is that the case?

Admiral Yost. I think that's a fair statement, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. I have the feeling that I would be more comfortable if you gentlemen interfaced more as you have here and that policy recommendations and strategy recommendations went up to a board from you. Is that possible?

Admiral Yost. That's being done. I just talked about the coordinating board, and I said everybody at this table or their boss is on that coordinating board.

Mr. Guarini. Is that a Washington board you're talking about?

Admiral Yost. Yes. It sits right under Mr. Meese.

Mr. Guarini. Well, how do they work on the border—DEA, INS, U.S. Customs—on the Mexican border? Is everything being operated long-distance from Washington by the authorities, or is there a way that they work in a coordinated team on the border itself? How do they pull their act together on a day-to-day basis? How do they meet? Where do they meet? What do they do?

Admiral Yost. Maybe I could talk about the Caribbean a little better than the Southwest. Maybe I ought to spin it off to one of these gentlemen who has been there more than six weeks.

Mr. Guarini. Well, let me ask the DEA. Let me ask the INS.

Do you meet on the border? Do you have a strategy meeting? Is there an exchange of information, regular, ongoing, resolutions, and meetings, as though you were a single organization fighting strongly this problem that we have?

Mr. Rosenblatt. Mr. Chairman, let me see if I can answer your question in an evolutionary way.

Some time ago, the Drug Policy Board was created and met. There is a Coordination Group of agency heads represented by the agencies here.

One of the tasks of the group in response to the board, which are department heads as well as Mr. Meese, the Attorney General, was to look at our national enforcement strategy. We broke that up into a number of components, and representatives from the various agencies are currently working on the strategy. The strategy is periodically reviewed and updated.

The strategy for interdiction, investigation, intelligence, et cetera, is going to be a changing, living, breathing product.

Mr. Guarini. You say it is going to be. Does that assume that it hasn't been in the past?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Oh, no. I'm saying that it's being looked at in a current fashion. There is already a national drug strategy that is out there.

Mr. GUARINI. But I'm talking about the border right now. Is there a strategy for the border?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. That would be interdiction, yes. That is being looked at, and as an out-growth of that, the Drug Policy Board——

Mr. GUARINI. But you lose me when you say "being looked at." Is there something in place that is ongoing, that is alive, that has vitality?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. Yes.

Mr. GUARINI. Is it something that we are about to put into place, or do we have something that is effective, that has already been implemented?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. On a day-to-day basis, down the southwest border, or whether it be even in the southeast, our field managers meet on a regular basis. I, for one, came from south Florida. I was a part of that south Florida task group. There was not a two-week period that did not go by that we did not meet at agency heads and——

Mr. GUARINI. Are these random meetings, or are these ongoing meetings?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. These were ongoing, scheduled meetings to find out where we were at and what we should do in conjunction with the response by drug traffickers to change their modes of drug smuggling.

Mr. GUARINI. Now who is in charge of that board of strategy?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. In that particular instance down in southeast Florida representing the Vice President happened to be——

Mr. GUARINI. I'm not talking about southeast Florida, I'm talking about the border.

Mr. ROSENBLATT. That is something that we are in the development phase right now with respect to the Southwest Border Initiative.

Mr. GUARINI. So we haven't really implemented or put any national strategy concerning our border in place yet, that we are still in the talking phase. Is that right?

Mr. ROSENBLATT. I would say we are in the talking as well as the finalization stage, sir.

Mr. GUARINI. We know 1.8 million illegal aliens are going to be coming across this year, I understand, from many different nations, not only Mexico, but I understand, as I heard it, there could be as many as 76 different nations that have been represented crossing the border, which means the whole world has got the signal that you can come into the United States illegally through the Mexican border. So it's not just a Mexican problem, from my understanding of it.

We have got a situation where we know that terrorists could come into our underbelly, we know that drugs are coming in in unprecedented quantities, and still we say we are in a talking stage. It just doesn't make sense to think that we would be that lax, not putting into place something that is effective, that we have a border strategy, that we do have a structure that the American people can depend upon.

This is obviously a tremendous void that exists in our country today and is going to cause us a tremendous amount of economic cost, displacement, and a problem that is only getting worse every day, and I just can't understand why people who are in charge of this say we're at the talking stage, that we're about to put something in place, that we haven't got something real and apparent that we can be proud of.

Mr. **Rosenblatt**. Congressman, we do have things in place, both from an individual agency standpoint as well as coordinated efforts that are ongoing and have been ongoing for some time.

In my initial response to your question, we think we can do collectively things a lot smarter and a lot better, and these are the things that we are discussing right now as a result of the drug policy coordination group.

Mr. **Guarini**. But it was you that told me that we are going to go from 1.2 million illegal aliens to 1.8 million illegal aliens. Was that your testimony?

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Guarini**. Oh, that was Mr. Brandemuehl.

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Guarini**. All right.

Now aren't we losing that war on the border? Aren't things getting worse? Aren't there more illegal aliens, more drugs, more problems? How can we say that we are effective with a national strategy if we are having such a poor result? We are not responsive to the magnitude of the problem. It's beyond the dimensions that we have addressed, so that the resources that we have thrown into the problem certainly don't match the size of the problem that we are facing.

Mr. **Brandemuehl**. No doubt the pressure in both the illegal alien field and also the drug trafficking is increasing, there's no doubt about it, but we are taking steps to address that now as a coordinative effort from all the agencies that you see here.

Also, we are pursing the immigration reform bill to the hilt, and hopefully that will be passed.

We also have added—under the southern border enhancement package, we added about 700 border patrolmen along our borders. We are adding a lot of equipment. A lot of this takes time to put in place.

Again, going back to the national strategy, we have NNBIS, which is coordinating all our agency efforts here so we can bring to bear all the assets of the Federal Government to try to address this. So we are in the process of doing this, and it is not as quick as we would all like, but it's coming along.

Mr. **Guarini**. I guess I share with you the same frustrations, because we are all in this together. It's just that when we see the results are so terrible, we have to say that there is something lacking.

You all are obviously very dedicated, committed people and have the same desire of everyone else to see that we address the problem effectively. But I think it's scary when you talk about the amount of drugs that are coming into the country from Mexico, I think it's scary when you talk about the 50 percent increase of illegal aliens that we expect this year, and I don't think our country has seen yet the amount of terrorism that it may see in the future, because that's a new form of warfare that is just on the horizon right now.

You people are on the front line, you're in the trenches, and if you don't have your act together, woe be the United States, we are all in deep trouble. So I think that it's very important that you not only do your job but wonder how you can better interface so that we can have a better cooperative system, and if we have got to put a lot of muscle on Mexico, then so be it.

But we have got to make sure that we are protecting our country. With the border of 2,000 miles totally defenseless against what is happening, it is your responsibility. You people are really on the front lines, and if you can't come up with the answers, we're all going to be in deep trouble as a nation.

The hearings and the field trips that we have had there have illustrated the futility of what is happening, and I think part of the answer is in the State Department. The State Department has really got to get to Mexico and let them know that we're not going to tolerate any longer the abuse that the United States has taken from Mexico in these areas.

Mr. Fauntroy, do you have any other statements to make or questions?

Mr. **Fauntroy**. No, thank you.

Mr. **Guarini**. Gentlemen, I want to thank all of you, because I do not want to give any impression other than the fact that I'm very grateful, and so is the committee, for the fine and the splendid job that you are doing. I think all of us have a sense of frustration and a sense that we can do more, and I certainly hope that the State Department will lend its full strength and force to try to give you the kind of support effort that you need to do the job that America is entitled to.

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

PREPARED STATEMENTS

TESTIMONY OF
ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY ANN B. WROBLESKI
(PRESENTED BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MARK DION)
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE & CONTROL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
July 22, 1986

MR. CHAIRMAN:

For many years, beginning in the mid-Seventies, narcotics experts from all parts of the globe were agreed that the Government of Mexico had successfully demonstrated both the political will and capability to locate and destroy illicit narcotic crops. Their findings, and those of Congressional fact finders, were amply documented in testimony before the United States Congress.

Indeed, the aerial herbicidal eradication campaigns against opium poppy and cannabis, and the high level of narcotics control cooperation between our governments, were the models for successive eradication campaigns in other countries. Mexican heroin, which once captured 87 percent of the U.S. market, held only a third of that market by 1980, while Mexican marijuana imports were declining so rapidly as to be a minimal factor. The program was obviously successful.

Yet, by 1985, it was equally obvious that the program was no longer as effective, and production of opium and marijuana for the United States market was increasing.

When we submitted our annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report to Congress on February 24, 1986, we community. Abundant rainfall and good climatic conditions for several years also contributed to bumper crops. Ironically, the program's success in the Seventies is also a factor in reduced effectiveness because it led Mexican officials to assume that the program required less monitoring, an attitude which contributed to the failure to make timely corrections in the program to overcome inefficiencies and to counter moves by traffickers.

Corruption is a constant factor in narcotics control equations in every source and transit country, certainly not just Mexico.

The Department of State noted in its annual report to Congress in February that corruption was among the factors contributing to the diminished effectiveness of the Mexican anti-narcotics program. The White House, State and Justice have emphasized, in subsequent statements, that the Government of Mexico shares not only this concern, but also shares our belief that the problem is best countered by coordinated efforts to eliminate the evils associated with the drug trade.

This diminished effectiveness has been observed not only in the eradication program, but also in those program elements which were never as successful, in our opinion, as the crop control project, for example, interdiction of contraband, seizures of laboratories and other assets, and arrests and prosecutions of major traffickers.

The deterioration in program effectiveness is reflected in our most recent data estimates.

The assessment contained in our 1986 annual report, was that, at the end of 1985, Mexico was perhaps once again the leading exporter of marijuana to the United States -- a function of its increasing production and declining production in Colombia -- and the single largest one-country source of heroin. We estimated that 1985 Mexican opium production was in the range of 21 to 45 metric tons, despite the reported eradication of 2,750 hectares of opium poppy. The mid-range estimate for 1985 is 3,520 hectares harvested. U.S. officials are especially concerned about the influx of "black tar" heroin which commonly has purity levels of 60 to 70 percent. In February, we reported that we did not have updated information on marijuana cultivation, and made a preliminary estimate, using 1984 data, that 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons of marijuana were harvested in 1985, and as much as 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons were exported to the United States. Now, DEA believes that Mexican marijuana exports to the United States in 1985 increased within a range of 3,000 to 3,500 metric tons. In our annual report, we also noted that eradication of marijuana had fallen to 2,945 hectares, compared to 3,600 hectares in 1984. More, there are estimates by U.S. officials that between 10 and 30 percent of the South American cocaine entering our country transits Mexico.

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee is currently finalizing its narcotics intelligence estimate for calendar year 1985, which will reflect further refinement of data on the situations we described in our own annual report, but, we can not at this time provide estimates on how much Mexican heroin was imported in 1985.

Continuing analysis indicates that opium production continues at this high level in 1986 (as much as 50 metric tons) with marijuana cultivation at least as high as in 1985.

Redressing the Problem

Throughout 1984 and into early 1985, State, Justice and Treasury officials had a series of quarterly meetings with Mexican government officials to review the situation. In the late Seventies, the conventional wisdom was that the Mexican government was finding most of the poppy and marijuana that had been planted and that their airfleets eradicated most of what was found. In late 1984, we expressed concern about operational problems. Moreover, we continued to direct Mexican attention to the need to bring other enforcement efforts up to the level of the eradication program; again, there has been less success in interdicting drugs in transit, seizing heroin laboratories, and arresting major traffickers than in eradicating the opium poppy and marijuana crops.

The entire dialogue took on a special urgency in February 1985, not only because DEA Agent Camarena was kidnapped, tortured and murdered by well-known Mexican traffickers, but because the ensuing investigation disclosed the scope of deterioration of the Mexican program at the Federal, state and local level, and especially the degree to which corruption had permeated key sectors of the system.

The United States Government began a series of meetings at the Cabinet level in the spring and summer of 1985 to review all of these problems with our Mexican colleagues. The seriousness with which we approached this mutual problem was underscored by Secretary Shultz who advised the Mexican Foreign Secretary that we consider narcotics control an issue which affects the whole of our bilateral relationship. The fourth in the series of meetings chaired by Attorneys General Meese and Garcia Ramirez was held in in Cancun this past April. Other periodic meetings have been held by Washington-based INM and DEA officials with our Mexican counterparts to review the agreements made at these ministerial meetings and to monitor progress. And, of course, our mission, including our narcotics assistance and DEA units, as well as the Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission, continue their daily dialogue with the Mexicans on a full range of issues.

Agreements on Program Improvement

These meetings have resulted in a number of agreements and actions in 1986 that give us a more optimistic assessment than the report we provided in February. We think the situation is much improved over the condition found by your Committee during its 1983 field inquiry and even since your recent border hearings on Mexico.

A substantial improvement in the program was agreed to by the Mexican Attorney General, following a joint field analysis of spraying operations, which involved INM field experts and Department of Agriculture herbicide experts. The Mexicans agreed to spray opium poppy plants even earlier in the cultivation cycle, and to integrate observation and eradication flights so as to make more effective utilization of aircraft.

At the April meeting in Cancun, the Attorneys General agreed on further initiatives to improve the eradication program, activities to improve the base of available information including cultivation and eradication data, on efforts to improve enforcement against trafficking, and on matters relating to the continuing investigation into the Camarena murder.

I am optimistic about the agreements reached during my meeting in Mexico June 18 with Attorney General Garcia Ramirez on a special campaign to be conducted in late September that would combine U.S. and Mexican aircraft for an intensive spraying campaign against opium poppy in the tri-state area of Sinaloa, Durango and Chihuahua, the heartland of the heroin industry in Mexico. The United States will supply six high-speed Thrush aircraft as part of a strike force that would also include three of the Attorney General's Bell 212 spray helicopters. The objective is to see just how much of the fall opium poppy crop can be destroyed through a high intensity campaign.

The existing INM-supported Mexican fleet will continue the regular spraying campaigns against other opium poppy cultivation and marijuana.

We also agreed that each of our governments would add $1.5 million to the eradication operation during the balance of this year, which is the subject of the reprogramming notice we have submitted to Congress. For our part, we are agreed to help the Attorney General's Office with the cost of the special aviation fuels which it must purchase, in Mexico or abroad, to fly the spray missions.

These latest accords are just part of the joint effort to identify critical deficiencies in the program and apply remedial measures. Since January, the following actions have been taken:

-- an aerial survey of opium poppy cultivation was conducted in the principal poppy cultivation areas.
-- coordination has been improved in the joint evaluation and verification program.
-- spraying operations have been enhanced by engaging the turbo Thrush and Bell 212 helicopters as spraying platforms.
-- a training seminar in the effective use of herbicide spraying was held for zone coordinators.
-- U.S. experts conducted an assessment of spraying operations and recommended use of a more effective 2,4-D formulation to destroy opium poppy.

- a new cooperative venture on data sharing and analysis was initiated which will improve program monitoring and management.
- aviation training center procedures were strengthened, which have improved flight safety in the MAGO fleet.

In the 130-day period ending May 10, 1986, the Mexican Attorney General's Office reported spraying:

12,136	poppy fields	1,095 hectares
3,589	marijuana fields	358 hectares
529	mixed fields	58 hectares
16,254	fields	1,511 hectares

Not least, plans are proceeding for a special Southwest border initiative, in which increased enforcement assets will be deployed in an intensified campaign to prevent illegal drugs and traffickers from crossing the long frontier between our two countries. The Department of the Treasury is heading this special task force, under the auspices of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, which also involves State, Justice and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System headed by the Vice President.

Conclusion

In conclusion, let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Administration is no less concerned than the Congress about the drug situation in Mexico. Resolving the problem in Mexico has our highest narcotics control priority, and the attention focused on that problem reflects that priority. The situation should be put in perspective. Are the levels of heroin and marijuana exports high? Surely, but not as high as when we first engaged in this joint venture in the Seventies, when we proved we were equal to the task. Have we encountered problems in performance? Surely, and we are overcoming them as rapidly as possible. Is the level of corruption high? Surely it is a serious problem, but the Mexican government has affirmed its commitment to investigate and prosecute any persons involved in drug trafficking, regardless of position, and has removed hundreds of individuals suspected of drug trafficking.

There is no point served in cursing the darkness. The only position worthy of our time and intellect was well stated by the Administration in June. I will paraphrase that statement: Our two governments have been engaged for many years in a joint effort to reduce drug production. We have had considerable success in the past, and we are making progress in improving our cooperative efforts to meet the challenges posed by increasingly powerful and wealthy international drug traffickers. The Mexican government is committed to overcoming the obstacles and achieving success in its anti-narcotics program. We are resolved to continue working together in a responsible manner.

That spirit of cooperation was very much the theme sounded by President Reagan on June 3, when he met with 24 Mexican legislators: "Where there is friction that is to be expected between friends, we must both try to find the true source of conflict and work for a solution. Nothing of value in this world is free or comes easy, even good relations between neighbors. I am personally confident about the nature of our future relations."

And that, Mr. Chairman, fairly well sums up the Department's position. We are working on a most complex, challenging, and sometimes dispiriting problem with a good neighbor who shares our need for a positive outcome.

Thank you.

Statement

of

THOMAS V. CASH

Deputy Assistant Administrator for Operations

DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
U.S. Department of Justice

on

DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN MEXICO AND ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

before the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

U.S. House of Representatives

Charles B. Rangel, Chairman

July 22, 1986

Chairman Rangel, Members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, I am pleased to appear before you today. As you have requested, I would like to discuss DEA's enforcement programs within Mexico and along the southwest border.

OVERVIEW OF MEXICAN DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING INTO THE UNITED STATES

Mexico is becoming increasingly prominent as a source of supply for heroin and marijuana, and a transshipment country for cocaine destined for the United States. Mexico is also a source for dangerous drugs consumed in the United States.

Heroin

Mexico continues to maintain its position as a major source of heroin to the United States, supplying an estimated 32 percent of the heroin available in the United States in 1984 and, based on reporting from DEA's Signature Program, 39 percent in 1985. This can be attributed to several factors such as improved drug cultivation techniques, recent favorable weather conditions for opium poppy cultivation and the attraction to wages by campesinos who cannot find work in Mexico's failing economy.

Heroin shipments are usually brought across the border in vehicles, or by pedestrians crossing a port of entry into the United States. Once in the United States, heroin is transported by vehicle or commercial carrier. Indicators suggest continued increases in Mexican heroin availability primarily in the Southwest and the West Coast, and in Chicago, Detroit and St. Louis, with no noticeable increases in the East.

The spread of Mexican black tar heroin into many areas of the United States is the most significant change in the trafficking of Mexican sourced heroin. Black tar heroin is smuggled into the United States primarily by illegal aliens and migrant workers and is present in 27 states. Purity levels have been analyzed as high as 93 percent, with 60 to 70 percent purity most common. Black tar heroin prices per milligram are, in the extreme, as low as 25 cents compared to $2.30 per milligram of other types of heroin in America. There are significant increases in heroin-related hospital emergencies in major cities where black tar heroin has been found.

Several indicators reflect a general trend of increasing Mexican heroin availability in the United States over the past several years. These indicators are decreasing prices and increasing average purity. The average price was steady at approximately 64 cents per milligram from 1982 through 1984, down from one dollar in 1981. As the price has fallen or remained steady, the purity level has climbed to 54 percent in 1984, as opposed to 20 percent purity in 1981.

There have been no major heroin seizures in Mexico in the past year. In 1985, 9 kilos of heroin were seized in Mexico, in contrast to 24 kilos seized in 1984. Scarce law enforcement resources, which has resulted in a lack of case development directed toward eventual arrest and seizure, and corruption are the principal reasons for the decline. Heroin conversion laboratory seizures in Mexico decreased to 2 in 1985, from the 12 made in 1984.

Limiting the trafficking of Mexican heroin to the United States needs investigative emphasis in the following directions: major narcotic trafficking heads and their high echelon members must be targeted and their organizations dismantled; the essential chemicals necessary for processing must be strictly controlled; laboratories must be destroyed; traffickers' assets must be seized, and their financial base eliminated.

Marijuana

The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee in 1984 estimated that Mexico accounted for 24 percent of the total amount of marijuana imported into the United States. As you are aware, we are now in the process of finalizing the 1985 estimates. And, while it would be premature to provide an exact estimate, suffice it to say that DEA believes cannabis production and trafficking of marijuana increased substantially in 1985.

Border seizures of marijuana have increased substantially, from 27 metric tons in 1983 to 78 metric tons to 1985. Although total seizures decreased about 10 percent from 1984 to 1985, the total number of seizure incidents increased about 17 percent from approximately 1,900 to 2,200 metric tons during the same period.

Cars and trucks are still the most frequently used method of smuggling marijuana into the United States from Mexico. Los Angeles, San Diego, Dallas, Phoenix, and New Orleans have all reported increased marijuana trafficking and seizures.

Mexican marijuana trafficking organizations continue to be responsible for all aspects of Mexican marijuana cultivation, production, and distribution to American wholesalers.

Cocaine

Currently, there is no known cultivation of coca in Mexico. Mexico is a transit country for cocaine of South American origin destined for the United States. Private aircraft are used predominantly to smuggle the cocaine base and cocaine hydrochloride to Mexico, generally in multi-hundred kilogram shipments.

Some Colombian traffickers have shifted or expanded their cocaine smuggling operations from South Florida to Mexico. For at least three years, major Colombian cocaine traffickers have been using Mexico as an alternative to the Caribbean to transship large quantities of cocaine into the United States. Nonetheless, the cocaine traffic through Florida continues at a high level.

In many cases, all aspects of the smuggling operation except the accommodation and refueling of the aircraft are accomplished by Colombian nationals. There are, however, a number of major Mexican cocaine traffickers who, upon delivery of the cocaine in Mexico from the Colombians, provide the final smuggling and distribution link. Furthermore, some Mexican traffickers may be obtaining cocaine directly from Bolivian or Peruvian sources of supply, circumventing the Colombians completely.

Because cocaine lab operators in Colombia are finding it more difficult to buy essential chemicals in other countries, they may be relocating their lab operations to Mexico. Ether, benzene, and acetone are legitimately manufactured in Mexico. Certain essential chemicals are difficult to control because of their widespread commercial use. The Mexican Government has established programs to monitor sales and shipments of certain essential chemicals. Unless the sale of these and other solvents is closely monitored, the conversion labs will probably increase.

Traffickers have been able to make landing and refueling arrangements in many locations in Mexico. The 1,800 mile United States border is crossed using private vehicles, commercial vehicles, or small aircraft. Some traffickers smuggling by land are breaking down shipments to quantities of 50 kilograms or less in an attempt to avoid detection. Private aircraft flying into the United States frequently carry multi-hundred kilos of cocaine.

After a cocaine shipment has been smuggled into the United States, it is transported overland to the West Coast, Florida, or to the northeast United States. In 1984, there was evidence that cocaine smuggled into the southwest United States was transported back to Miami for redistribution. Recent evidence indicates the shipments are now being forwarded directly to the immediate distribution location. Mexican groups typically forward cocaine to the primary U.S. point of distribution.

Cocaine seizure statistics in Mexico show a sharp increase. The amount of cocaine seized in Mexico increased from 444 kilos in 1984 to more than 2,500 kilos in 1985. There were also over 30 arrests at international airports in Mexico of cocaine couriers who were in transit to other destinations.

For example, on May 17, 1986, the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP) seized over 250 kilograms in a violent confrontation in which three traffickers were killed. A later seizure of 26 kilograms at the Port of Entry in Adrade, California was tied to this seizure. Further, on June 22nd of this year, the MFJP, accompanied by DEA, seized 470 kilograms of cocaine at Tamuim Airport in Mexico.

Since 1983, as evidenced by seizure data, the amount of cocaine smuggled across the United States/Mexico border has increased. While the amount of cocaine seized nearly doubled from 1983 to 1984, more than four times as much cocaine was seized in 1985 as in 1984. The average size seizure along the southwest border increased from less than 1 kilo to more than 3 kilos in 1985.

The greatest number of cocaine seizures at the border have been recorded in California, but the quantities involved have been considerably smaller than in most other border states. Texas, on the other hand, was the site of less than one-third of the cocaine seizures last year, but those seizures amounted to three-fourths of the total quantity seized. In 1985, 137 kilos of cocaine were seized in California as opposed to 852 kilos in Texas.

Cocaine smuggled via Mexico to Texas is generally directed towards landing strips or drop sites in the Lubbock and northern Texas areas, to El Paso and Arizona as a drop-off point for cocaine intended primarily for California, and to the Houston area.

Dangerous Drugs

The dangerous drugs most commonly smuggled from Mexico to the United States are: amphetamines and other stimulants, such as phentermine (Ionamin) and fenthylline (Captagon), methamphetamine, Mandrax and counterfeit Quaalude tablets produced from methaqualone, Mandrax and Quaalude tablets composed of secobarbital, PCP, and the controlled substance analogs MPPP and PEPAP.

The number of reported seizures of clandestinely manufactured dangerous drugs along the Mexico/United States border increased steadily in 1985; however, the quantities involved declined sharply. This decline can partially be attributed to enforcement activity within Mexico.

In July 1985 near Tijuana, the MFJP seized a clandestine methamphetamine laboratory which was capable of producing multi-million dosage units monthly. The ultimate wholesale purchasers for the methamphetamine were associated with the Hell's Angels motorcycle gang. In addition, significant arrests of traffickers involved in the diversion of legitimately manufactured controlled pharmaceuticals were made in Mexico.

The diversion of legitimately produced drugs from Mexico to the United States occurs at two distinct levels within the distribution chain. First is the diversion of the bulk powder from international commerce. Powder is obtained from other countries by traffickers and used in the production of counterfeit tablets at clandestine laboratories in Mexico.

The second type of diversion occurs after a legitimate manufacturer has processed bulk powder in dosage unit form for sale at the wholesale and retail level. Due to close cooperation between the Mexican and United States Governments, actions have been taken to eliminate or decrease problems associated with fenethylline (Captagon), phentermine (Ionamin), and codeine cough syrup (Dimetane).

U.S. DRUG LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS AT THE MEXICAN BORDER

As of the end of June, DEA has 161 Special Agents stationed in offices along the Mexican Border. There are also 32 agents stationed in Mexico.

Operation Padrino

In April 1983, DEA initiated Operation Padrino to investigate and immobilize what was thought to be a major heroin distribution network. It was soon determined that Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, a well-documented international cocaine drug trafficker from Honduras, had joined forces with Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo, a well-known heroin trafficker, for the purpose of distributing cocaine into the United States.

Investigation into the organization spread from Mexico to Colombia and Spain. It was learned that the organization had distributed several thousand kilos of cocaine in the United States. Additional developments in June 1984 led to the seizure of over $11.5 million in cash. Cocaine seizures of 760 kilos in Young, Arizona on August 14, 1984 and 169 kilos in Los Angeles on October 10, 1984 were identified as belonging to the organization.

As of November 1985, the overall cocaine seized from the organization totaled more than 5,000 pounds with a wholesale value of over $121 million. Property asset seizures total over $5 million. U.S. currency cash seizures totaled over $56 million.

Nevertheless, the organization continues to operate. The investigation remains multi-national with at least four foreign countries involved, along with eight DEA Field Divisions, EPIC, and DEA Headquarters working together to immobilize the upper echelon of this organization.

Based on information provided by several of these DEA offices, Colombian authorities arrested Matta-Ballesteros during April 1985. Matta-Ballesteros subsequently escaped from prison in Colombia on March 19th of this year and we believe that he is currently in Honduras.

Operation Pipeline

Operation Pipeline was begun by the New Mexico State Police in 1983 to identify, intercept, arrest, and prosecute cocaine couriers using major highways. DEA resources are being used to train state and local police for this operation in over 30 states from Florida to the West Coast. Over 70 cocaine and money seizures have been made by the New Mexico State Police alone. As this operation expands, it holds great promise for severely disrupting the south to north distribution of drugs from Mexico.

Other Joint U.S. Enforcement Activity

DEA has established 34 State and Local Task Forces and 13 shared funding task forces in which DEA Special Agents and officers from state and local law enforcement agencies cooperate on narcotics investigations in order to disrupt the illicit drug traffic in certain geographic areas. Along the border, we have task forces in Fort Worth, Lubbock, Laredo, and San Antonio, Texas; Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona; and San Diego, California.

We also work in cooperative efforts without task forces. In one recent cooperative effort with state and local agencies, DEA, the New Mexico State Police, the El Paso Police Department, and the El Paso Sheriff's Department seized over 600 pounds of cocaine in New Mexico and Texas. The drug trafficking organization responsible for these shipments is based in Colombia and Mexico.

Additionally, the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) based in El Paso investigates major trafficking organizations that smuggle drugs across the Mexican/U.S. border. In one recent El Paso OCDETF case, approximately 24 pounds of black tar heroin, with a purity of 66 percent, were seized in Dallas. Five were arrested. The heroin was smuggled into the U.S. at the Acuna, Mexico/Del Rio, Texas Port of Entry. This cooperative investigation was the single largest seizure of black tar heroin for DEA/Dallas.

Camarena Investigation

DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena was abducted and murdered on February 7, 1985, in Mexico. It is strongly believed that the abduction and murder were carried out by targets of Operation Padrino, with the assistance of former and present Mexican police officials, to retaliate against DEA's effectiveness in that operation.

The investigation into Special Agent Camarena's death is still ongoing in Mexico and is the subject of continued high-level meetings. Mexican authorities have arrested Sergio Espino-Verdin, a former DFS commandante, who admits that he was part of the team that held Special Agent Camarena.

DEA and the FBI are conducting an investigation in the United States looking towards U.S. indictments of those involved for violation of United States law.

Southwest Border Initiative

The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board has directed Mr. Frank Keating, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement and Operations, to develop the Southwest Border Initiative. Those operating plans are currently being developed. Inasmuch as the Drug Enforcement Administration has an assistance and support role in this important undertaking, it would be inappropriate for me to comment further at this time.

JOINT U.S/MEXICAN INITIATIVES

Operation Vanguard

Operation Vanguard is a United States operation in which the Government of Mexico (GOM) invites U.S. observers to accompany verification elements of the Mexican Attorney General's Office (MAGO) to verify cannabis and opium poppy herbicidal eradication. Through Operation Vanguard, assistance is provided to the MAGO eradication program. Aerial reconnaissance is used to detect the location of illicit cultivation sites and then verify their destruction.

It is worth noting that the February to March 1986 phase of Operation Vanguard proved to be one of the most productive in the history of this special program. Total flight hours were up, and the verification program was generating encouraging information. During this phase, maintenance problems were minimal, with only routine downtime arising as scheduled inspections came due. There are regular weekly meetings between DEA in Mexico and the MAGO to discuss any problems which could negatively impact on this important program.

MEXICAN-AMERICAN MEETINGS

Subsequent to the abduction and murder of Special Agent Camarena and the poor performance of Operation Vanguard, the Governments of Mexico and the United States have held a series of meetings to reaffirm their allegiance and move forward on joint narcotics programs. In the past year, the Attorneys General of both countries met twice and President Reagan and President de la Madrid have discussed narcotics matters in their meetings.

The Mexican-American Law Enforcement Summit was last held in April 1986 in Cancun. Initiatives on eradication, trafficking, fugitives, mutual legal assistance, and other matters proposed at the summit were agreed to by the Attorneys General.

As a result of the Cancun meeting, U.S. Federal officials have met with their Mexican Federal and state counterparts in a series of meetings. Two have taken place in Mexico and there was one meeting in San Diego and another in San Antonio. It is from meetings such as these that we can sense genuine progress. We are seeing bilateral working relationships develop; we are seeing certain programs become institutionalized and formalized.

For example, in learning of the U.S. program to develop a comprehensive Southwest Border Strategy, our counterparts voiced genuine concern and interest in supporting our initiatives. I also believe that the significant progress we have seen with the current eradication effort is attributable to this enhanced dialogue.

CONCLUSION

DEA believes that the drug law enforcement relationship between the United States and Mexico is on firmer ground as a result of the many efforts I have described today. The Attorneys General and Presidents of both countries have reaffirmed their goals in the drug suppression effort.

The Drug Enforcement Administration hopes that in the coming months and years bilateral agreements with Mexico will prove to be effective in upgrading drug law enforcement in Mexico and on the Mexican-United States border, and thus turn around the increased flow of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this Committee's interest in Mexican-United States relations regarding drug law enforcement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

US Department
of Transportation
**United States
Coast Guard**

Commandant
United States Coast Guard

Washington, DC 20593
Staff Symbol
Phone

STATEMENT

OF

ADMIRAL PAUL A. YOST
COMMANDANT, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

BEFORE THE

HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

JULY 22, 1986

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to provide an overview on the Coast Guard's role in drug law enforcement along the southwest border of the United States.

As you know, there has been a substantial increase in drug smuggling on our Southwest Border, which is probably, at least partly, a reaction to the successful multiagency interdiction efforts in the Caribbean over the last two years. This same type of cooperative effort, the Southwest Border Initiative, is currently being taken to gain control of the Southwest Border. To do otherwise would be pointless. Unless all these avenues of drug trafficking are successfully blocked, our interdiction efforts in other areas are to no avail.

The Southwest Border Initiative is primarily focused toward the interdiction of narcotics coming by land or air across the land border with Mexico. However, the U.S. Coast Guard, as the nation's primary maritime law enforcement agency, has been active in its planning. If the initiative is successful, we expect there will be some spillover to maritime trafficking and we stand ready to interdict these vessels. Therefore, we will conduct drug interdiction operations in support of the initiative on the high seas in the Gulf of Mexico and off the coast of southern California.

Coast Guard aircraft will conduct surveillance flights in these areas to assist Coast Guard cutters in locating and identifying vessels carrying contraband en route to the United States. We also expect to deploy Coast Guard law enforcement teams aboard U.S. Navy ships transiting or operating in these areas as the ships are made available. In addition, Coast Guard small boats at our stations near the U.S./Mexican border will be available to assist Customs Service marine modules intercept drug laden vessels nearer our southern shores.

Coast Guard aircraft, cutters, boats and personnel will be made available to assist the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Customs Service, Border Patrol and other agencies in support of this worthwhile initiative. Coast Guard personnel assigned to the Southwest Region of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) and to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) will continue to provide direct intelligence coordination and support to the interdiction forces along the border. A Coast Guard officer has been assigned to the Regional Commissioner of Customs for the Southwest Region, the overall coordinator of the initiative, to assist in operational planning and coordination. In the course of normal Coast Guard operations, our units will continue to provide real-time intelligence on maritime smuggling activity which might assist in identifying and responding to shifting narcotics trafficking patterns along the border and offshore.

The very nature of drug trafficking makes it a multinational venture. It is an international problem that requires the full cooperation of foreign government forces to stop. To be effective, operations along the Southwest Border will require the full cooperation of Mexico. In our maritime activities, we have been working toward that goal.

In the summer of 1984, the commanding officer of CGC ACUSHNET established a very productive working relationship with local Mexican Navy officials during a port visit in Cozumel. This working relationship has endured. In November and December, 1984, in three separate cases, drug smuggling vessels were pursued by

CGC ACUSHNET. All three were intercepted and seized by Mexican Navy vessels in Mexican territorial waters, resulting in the interdiction of over 77,000 pounds of marijuana. In July, 1985, CGC VALIANT consensually boarded a Mexican flag vessel 35 miles north of the Yucatan Peninsula and located seven tons of marijuana in hidden compartments. The Government of Mexico was notified of the discovery through our Embassy in Mexico City. Two Mexican Navy patrol boats were immediately dispatched and, at the request of the Mexican Government, CGC VALIANT detained the vessel until the patrol boats arrived. In March, 1986, CGC DURABLE consensually boarded a sinking Mexican flag vessel in the Gulf of Mexico and discovered six tons of marijuana aboard. The five Mexican crewmen were evacuated to CGC DURABLE, which contacted a Mexican Navy frigate patrolling in the area. The five crewmen and evidence obtained from the sinking vessel were then transferred to the Mexican frigate.

These incidents point to a good relationship with the Mexican Navy on the unit level. We are making every effort to nurture this high level of cooperation between our units and the local Mexican Navy commanders through continuing port visits and other initiatives. During a patrol this last June, CGC VENTUROUS made port calls in La Paz, Mazatlan, and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. Warm and hospitable, the Mexican Navy Officials were receptive to developing mutual working relationships further.

We are also seeking ways to continue to improve our relationship with the Government of Mexico. On February 18, 1986, Admiral Ramirez de Arellano, then Chief of Naval Operations of the Mexican Navy, visited Washington, D.C., met with Admiral Gracey, then Commandant of the Coast Guard and held day-long meetings with high level members of the Commandant's staff. In April, Vice Admiral Stabile, then Vice Commandant, and Rear Admiral Robbins, Chief, Office of Operations, accompanied the Attorney General to the Mexican-American Law Enforcement Summit in Cancun to discuss law enforcement matters of mutual concern. Just last week, Rear Admiral Robbins met with the recently appointed Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Mauricio Schleske Sanchez, and his staff. We believe these meetings have led to even closer relationships with local Mexican Navy commanders and increased cooperation from the Mexican Government.

This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions you or the members of the Committee may have.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM ROSENBLATT
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
JULY , 1986

Mr. Chairman, I am delighted to have this opportunity to appear before you today to describe the serious law enforcement challenge that the Customs Service faces along this country's border with Mexico.

As Assistant Comissioner for Enforcement at Customs I am responsible for coordinationg customs' response to what may be developing into our country's number one drug smuggling threat area.

Mr. Chairman, we are attempting to deal with an increasingly difficult situation at the Mexican border.

Mexico is now the number one source of heroin and marijuana entering the United States and over 30 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United States enters from Mexico.

The crisis on our southwest border is evidenced by growing corruption in Mexico, increased acts of violence on both sides of the border, increased seizures of narcotics, an increased

PRESENCE OF COLOMBIAN NARCO-TRAFFICKERS AND EVIDENCE OF A HUGE INCREASE IN CASH ACTIVITY WITHIN THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LOCATED IN U.S. BORDER TOWNS.

SMUGGLERS HAVE BEEN BUILDING NEW LANDING STRIPS IN MEXICO LESS THAN 100 MILES SOUTH OF OUR BORDER. THEY ARE BUILDING WAREHOUSES TO STORE VAST AMOUNTS OF DRUGS.

COLOMBIAN SMUGGLERS ARE SETTLING ALONG THE BORDER. THEY ARE BUYING THE SERVICES OF MEXICANS TO CARRY THEIR DRUGS INTO THE UNITED STATES. THE COLOMBIANS ARE BRINGING MORE VIOLENCE WITH THEM.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I AM SURE YOU WILL RECALL THE VIVID IMAGES OF WHAT SOUTHERN FLORIDA WAS LIKE SIX YEARS AGO. COLOMBIAN DRUG SMUGGLERS WERE GUNNING EACH OTHER DOWN IN CROWDED SHOPPING CENTERS IN BROAD DAYLIGHT. THEY HAD NO REGARD FOR HUMAN LIFE, AND IN THEIR MINDS, THERE WERE NO INNOCENT VICTIMS.

WE ARE BEGINNING TO SEE MANY OF THE SAME WARNING SIGNS WE SAW IN SOUTHERN FLORIDA, NOW TURNING UP ALONG OUR 2000-MILE BORDER WITH MEXICO. NOT TOO LONG AGO, A CUSTOMS PATROL OFFICER

WAS GUNNED DOWN IN SELLS, ARIZONA. OUR INVESTIGATION OF THAT SHOOTING IS CONTINUING.

OUR SOUTHERN BORDER HAS ALWAYS BEEN OPEN AND FREE, THE WAY MOST AMERICANS WANT IT. WE ARE NOT GOING TO ERECT AN IRON CURTAIN BETWEEN OURSELVES AND MEXICO, BUT MR. CHAIRMAN, WE MUST SOUND THE ALARM THAT OUR BORDER IS BEING VIOLATED AT WILL. OUR SOUTHERN BORDER IS INDEED FAST BECOMING WHAT SOUTHERN FLORIDA WAS LIKE SIX YEARS AGO.

CUSTOMS HAS, IN RECENT MONTHS, RESPONDED TO THIS CRISIS WITH A REALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL TRAINED AGENTS, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATORS, NARCOTICS DOG HANDLERS, INSPECTORS, AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS TO PRIORITY LOCATIONS ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER.

AT THE SAME TIME, CUSTOMS HAS GIVEN TOP PRIORITY TO THE HIRING OF CRACK FIXED-WING AND HELICOPTER PILOTS NEEDED TO WAGE THE NARCOTICS AIR WAR IN THE SOUTHWEST.

CUSTOMS' ENHANCED PRESENCE ON THE BORDER ALONG WITH RESOURCES FROM ITS SISTER FEDERAL AGENCIES, INS, DEA AND FBI, WILL MAKE A DIFFERENCE AS IT DID IN SOUTHERN FLORIDA FOUR YEARS AGO. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE EASY ACCESS SMUGGLERS HAVE TO MEXICAN TERRITORY, ONE OF THE MOST ENCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT

WOULD BE FOR MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS TO MOVE FORWARD, SHOULDER TO SHOULDER WITH US, AGAINST NARCOTICS SMUGGLING INTERESTS. I AM AWARE OF HIGH LEVEL DISCUSSIONS WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL RESULT IN BETTER COOPERATION BETWEEN THE U.S. AND MEXICO. I AM SURE LAW ABIDING CITIZENS ON BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER WOULD WELCOME PROGRESS THAT CAN BE MADE IN THAT AREA.

CUSTOMS APPRECIATES THE CONCERNS OF THIS TASK FORCE REGARDING THE WAR ON DRUGS. I WOULD BE GLAD TO ANSWER QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE ON CUSTOMS' SOUTHWEST BORDER OPERATIONS.

Department of Justice

STATEMENT

OF

ROGER P. BRANDEMUEHL
ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
BORDER PATROL

BEFORE

THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

CONCERNING

NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS
ALONG THE SOUTHERN LAND BORDER

ON

JULY 22, 1986

STATEMENT ON INCREASED SOUTHERN BORDER DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ILLEGAL ALIEN APPREHENSIONS

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN. IT CERTAINLY IS A PRIVILEGE TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMITTEE TODAY.

I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY COMMENT UPON THE INCREASED ILLEGAL ALIEN AND DRUG TRAFFICKING ACROSS OUR SOUTHERN LAND BORDER.

SINCE THE BEGINNING OF FISCAL YEAR 1985 THE NUMBER OF BORDER PATROL AGENTS ON THE UNITED STATES/MEXICO BORDER HAS BEEN INCREASED BY ONE-THIRD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1985 INS SOUTHERN BORDER ENHANCEMENT PACKAGE. WE HAVE ADDED AND ARE CONTINUING TO ADD EQUIPMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY TO INCREASE OUR EFFECTIVENESS IN THE DETECTION AND APPREHENSION OF ILLEGAL ALIENS. FOR THE PAST FEW YEARS OUR APPREHENSION FIGURES HAVE SOARED AT UNPRECEDENTED RATES. LAST YEAR THE BORDER PATROL APPREHENDED A RECORD 1.2 MILLION ILLEGAL ALIENS. THE FIRST NINE MONTHS OF THIS FISCAL YEAR (OCTOBER-JUNE), APPREHENSIONS ARE RUNNING 41 PERCENT AHEAD OF LAST YEAR ALONG THE UNITED STATES - MEXICAN BORDER. AS A RESULT, WE HAVE RAISED OUR ESTIMATE OF APPREHENSIONS FOR THIS FISCAL YEAR TO 1.8 MILLION--50 PERCENT ABOVE THE RECORD 1.2 MILLION LAST YEAR. PART OF THIS INCREASE CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ADDED RESOURCES BEING APPLIED TO THE SOUTHERN BORDER. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THE MAJOR REASON FOR THE DRAMATIC INCREASE IN APPREHENSION IS THAT A SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER FLOW OF PEOPLE ARE TRYING TO ILLEGALLY ENTER THE UNITED STATES AS A

RESULT OF CONTINUING SOCI-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN MEXICO, CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICA.

INS IS PURSUING SEVERAL INITIATIVES WITH MEXICO TO HELP STEM THE INCREASING FLOW OF PEOPLE ACROSS THE SOUTHERN BORDER. WE HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN DEVELOPING WAYS TO ENHANCE MEXICO'S ABILITY TO INTERDICT AND REMOVE FROM MEXICO OTHER THAN MEXICAN NATIONALS THAT ARE TRAVELLING THROUGH THEIR COUNTRY AND THEN ILLEGALLY ENTERING THE UNITED STATES. INS IS WORKING WITH MEXICO'S OFFICIALS TO TIGHTEN THEIR VISA REQUIREMENTS FOR PEOPLE TRAVELLING FROM THE EASTERN HEMISPHERE TO IDENTIFY THOSE WHO WILL ILLEGALLY ENTER THE UNITED STATES.

LAST FISCAL YEAR THE BORDER PATROL WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR 825 NARCOTIC SEIZURES ALONG OUR BORDERS FOR AN AVERAGE OF OVER 2 A DAY. FOR THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF THIS YEAR (OCTOBER-MAY) THE PATROL HAS MADE 903 SEIZURES FOR AN AVERAGE OF JUST OVER 4 A DAY. WE NOW ESTIMATE OVER 1,200 SEIZURES WILL BE MADE THIS YEAR WITH A VALUE IN EXCESS OF $150 MILLION. THE BORDER PATROL HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY INVOLVED IN THE INTERDICTION OF DRUGS ALONG OUR LAND BORDERS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

1) THE PATROL'S LARGE PRESENCE ON THE BORDER MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO AVOID INVOLVEMENT.

2) THE PATROL'S MANDATE, EXPERTISE AND RESOURCES ARE DIRECTED AT THE PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF PERSONS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES.

3) THE SAME METHODS OF ENTRY, AND ROUTES OF TRAVEL ARE USED BY VIRTUALLY ALL SMUGGLERS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY ARE SMUGGLING: PEOPLE, DRUGS, OR OTHER CONTRABAND.

4) COMMERCIAL DRUG SMUGGLING OPERATIONS ACROSS THE LAND BORDER, AND BETWEEN THE PORTS OF ENTRY, PRIMARILY UTILIZE ALIENS TO ACTUALLY INTRODUCE THE NARCOTICS INTO THE UNITED STATES.

5) BORDER PATROL STEPPED-UP ITS DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORT BY PLACING SPECIAL EMPHASIS ALONG THE IMMEDIATE BORDER AREA AND AT BORDER PATROL CHECK POINTS. THIS NEW ROLE, UNDERTAKEN BY THE PATROL, IS PART OF AN OVERALL EFFORT TO ENHANCE SOUTHWEST BORDER COVERAGE THAT COMBINES THE EFFORTS OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES, UNDER THE COORDINATION OF THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM (NNBIS).

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING THE BORDER IS AN EXTREMELY DIFFICULT AND SERIOUS ONE. WE ARE EXPLORING EVERY POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM. RECENT LIAISON WITH THE MILITARY HAS LEAD TO OUR POSSIBLE ACQUISITION OF VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS, SENSOR SYSTEMS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT. IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS A JOINT ARMY-INS ENHANCED INFRARED IMAGING VEHICLE PROJECT WILL BE COMPLETED, WHEREBY ELEVEN VEHICLES WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH STATE OF THE ART INFRARED NIGHT VISION DEVICES SUPPLIED BY INS. ANOTHER MILITARY COOPERATIVE VENTURE HAS PROVIDED THE BORDER PATROL ITS ESSENTIAL NIGHT AIR OPERATIONS CAPABILITY ALONG THE BORDERS THROUGH THE LOAN OF TWELVE U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD HELICOPTERS.

AS A RESULT OF THESE EFFORTS AND ADDED RESOURCES MORE PEOPLE AND DRUGS ARE BEING STOPPED AT THE BORDER, ALTHOUGH BY NO MEANS ARE WE ENCOUNTERING ALL OF THEM. WE NEED IMMIGRATION REFORM LEGISLATION TO TURN OFF THE MAGNET THAT DRAWS THESE PEOPLE TO OUR COUNTRY. WITH NEW LEGISLATION WE CAN CONTINUE OUR STEPS TOWARD RESTORING THE INTEGRITY OF OUR BORDER.

I FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT THERE IS NOW, MORE THAN EVER BEFORE, THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO A VISIBLE, STRONG AND EFFECTIVE BORDER ENFORCEMENT. TO DO LESS WILL ENCOURAGE A PERVASIVE ATTITUDE FOR ILLEGAL ALIENS, DRUG TRAFFICKERS AND OTHER CRIMINAL ELEMENT TO CONTINUE TO IGNORE OUR LAWS.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT R. TEMPLE, JR.

DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

JULY 22, 1986

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Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful for the opportunity to address this Select Committee and present information regarding National Guard support to the national drug enforcement effort. Trafficking in illegal drugs has created a menacing stigma on a large segment of our society. This monumental problem must be dealt with by agressive means, and brought decisively to an end.

The Army and Air National Guard ARE proud to participate, directly and indirectly, in support of law enforcement efforts to eliminate the flow and use of illicit drugs in the United States. National Guard efforts continue to expand annually in support of both the eradication of domestic marijuana and interdiction programs. Our support has consisted primarily of observation, reporting, transportation of law enforcement personnel and the loan of equipment to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement operations.

Support is provided by the National Guard basically in two statuses. First, in State Active Duty, where the governors use their National Guard to assist law enforcement in drug control operations at the state and local levels. This support is funded primarily by the state and, secondly, incidental to the National Guard's federally funded, scheduled training. It is the policy of the National Guard Bureau to support drug enforcement operations where ever and when ever possible as long as the support provided does not detract from training for our war time mission. The National Guard Bureau has made an extra effort to optimize the use of scheduled training to provide support, thereby obtaining double value for our tax dollars.

National Guard support to drug enforcement had a somewhat modest beginning in 1983, when initally, only four states reported involvement in drug related missions. The level of support has escalated dramatically since that time. In Calendar Year 1985, twenty states reported accomplishing a total of 207 drug related support missions, plus 26 loans of equipment. These missions involved observation and reporting of suspected marijuana cultivations during normal training flights, to transportation of law enforcement personnel involved in actual drug enforcement control operations. During Calendar Year 1985, the majority of support provided involved the use of aviation assets. A total of 1764 sorties, by both ARNG and ANG aircraft were flown for a total of 2384 flying hours. This was accomplished within the normal flying hour program for each type aircraft involved. The net result of this support was the reported destruction of 229,000 marijuana plants by civil authorities, which had an approximate street value of $260,000,000. Support of interdiction efforts consisted primarily of use of ANG radar in Arizona, OV-1 aircraft support of the U.S. Coast Guard on both the East and West coasts, and use of other tactical aircraft to observe and report suspect watercraft movement.

Thus far in 1986, 14 states have reported missions in support of drug enforcement operations. This includes continued support of U.S. Coast Guard on both East and West coasts, which resulted in the confiscation of 40 tons of marijuana in a single support mission, support of the Drug Enforcement Agency with helicopters for raids of drug laboratories on the West coast.

and normal support of the eradication of marijuana efforts, to include: observation, reporting and transportation of law enforcement personnel.

In addition, 33 states have had ARNG and ANG aviators trained by civil law enforcement authorities in the techniques of aerial spotting of marijuana fields, and 35 states have either a written or verbal agreement with state law enforcement authorities which are involved in drug enforcement operations.

During June, 1986, members of the National Guard Bureau staff and I, visited the United States Border Patrol in the El Paso and San Diego sectors. Our purpose was to establish lines of communication and discuss possible increased levels of support, over and above that which we are now providing. Currently, we have on loan a number of OH-6 helicopters, and are providing assistance in maintaining aviator proficiency. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will submit their request for increased National Guard support through official DoD channels. Also, I have recently sent a message to the Adjutant General of Oregon to meet with U.S. Border Patrol officials in the San Diego sector and with personnel from the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System in Long Beach, CA, to discuss and evaluate possible increased support by our OV-1 aircraft stationed in Oregon.

In summary, the National Guard will continue every effort to provide a continued level of support to drug enforcement agencies at local, county, state, and federal levels. However, a proper balance must be maintained so as to not adversely impact on our federal training mission requirements.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee. I would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.

STATEMENT OF COLONEL HARVEY G. POTHIER, USAF

ACTING DIRECTOR

DOD TASK FORCE ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

BEFORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE

ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

JULY 22, 1986

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Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before this Select Committee again. The threat of illegal narcotics trafficking cannot be ignored. We must rid our nation of this grave threat. This requires the full focus, cooperation, and contribution of all federal, state, and local law enforcement officials and supporting agencies. It is a privilege to represent the Department of Defense in this most important program. Our role is to support drug law enforcement agencies with sophisticated equipment loans; to provide aerial, maritime and ground surveillance of drug trafficking personnel, vehicles, ships and aircraft; and to provide intelligence and communications to improve drug law enforcement effectiveness. While the Department of Defense support posture maintains the historical separation between civilian law enforcement and military missions as required by the Posse Comitatus Act, we endeavor to maximize assistance permitted under Public Law 97-86, particularly, in terms of training exercises. For example, during the first half of fiscal year 1986 we flew over 6,000 hours of surveillance in support of drug law enforcement. These surveillance missions were provided incidental to normal military operations and training. We have maintained our high levels of military preparedness through careful joint planning with law enforcement authorities.

Since 1981, the Department of Defense's indirect support role has changed significantly. We have transitioned from the role of a passive equipment provider to that of a highly active and vital source of tactical surveillance and intelligence information.

Reflective of our strong commitment to this most important anti-drug campaign, we are now prepared to render our most significant contribution to date. The Administration has recently proposed a

Government-wide enhancement package which would initiate improvements to several of the critical components of the Government's overall anti-drug strategy. The Defense Department contributions to this proposal will greatly improve this nation's capability to interdict illicit drug traffickers at or near our borders. We are prepared to move forward in the most timely manner possible after obtaining Congressional approval for the overall Administration proposal.

The DoD element of the proposal provides a combination of fixed-wing surveillance aircraft and balloon-borne tethered aerostat radar systems that afford the advantage of detecting and tracking aircraft attempting to cross our national borders below the radar coverage of ground-based radars. The Administration proposal calls for the Navy to loan four E-2C airborne early warning aircraft for use by law enforcement authorities along the southern U.S. tier. The receiving agency will operate and maintain the aircraft during peacetime.

The Air Force will procure five state-of-the-art tethered aerostat radar systems for Customs Service to operate and maintain in peacetime. The Administration proposal would position these airborne radars along the U.S./Mexican border adding a new dimension to the U.S. Government's deterrent posture against airborne drug trafficking.

The Air Force will also modify two C-130 Hercules aircraft with special sensors for use nearer the drug production and processing areas. These aircraft will be assigned to the U.S. Southern Command in Panama and will greatly improve our ability to determine the types and levels of drug activity in areas adjacent to drug producing countries in Central and South America.

The multi-Service DoD contribution also includes rotary-wing helicopter support as a by-product of mission and training activity. The Secretary of Defense forwarded this plan to the Congress in January. Selected Army, Marine, and Air Force units are prepared to assist on a case-by-case request basis. These helicopter units are based across the southern United States.

The Department of Defense commitment goes far beyond the provisioning of equipment to law enforcement authorities. In April 1986 the President signed a National Security Decision Directive on Narcotics and National Security. This document assessed the threat from the international narcotics trade and directed specific actions to increase the effectiveness of U.S. counter-narcotics efforts. While the decision directive applies to many departments and agencies, the Department of Defense has been directed by the Commander-in-Chief to support more actively counter-narcotics efforts in many areas. Accordingly, we are and will continue to be increasingly involved in supporting the interdiction of drugs coming into this country. We, however, believe the proper role for our military forces is to provide support so that civilian law enforcement agencies can make necessary arrests, searches, and seizures. This will help them enhance their enforcement capabilities and provide a proper focus for the armed forces without compromising the traditional separation of the military from civilian activities. In that regard, we are working closely with the law enforcement community to increase this type of indirect assistance. For example, this month the Army accommodated a Border Patrol loan request for one thousand M-14 rifles, platoon early warning sensor systems, long-range night observation devices, and armored personnel carriers for use along the Mexican border. We are also taking major steps in countries other than the U.S. to deal with the problem at its source. While we cannot discuss these in any detail, they are accomplished in full accord with the host countries and they are very effective. We intend to continue to provide support on an increasing scale consistent with national defense requirements, and to the extent we are funded to do so.

Mr. Chairman, the Department of Defense is proud to support this nation's campaign against illicit drugs whose effects can indirectly or directly touch each of us and our fellow citizens. I commend you, Mr. Chairman, and your distinguished colleagues for your continued support to enable the Department of Defense to effectively assist drug law enforcement.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before your committee. Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to any answer questions at this time.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING NARCOTICS CONTROL ON THE SOUTHWEST BORDER AND IN MEXICO

ON THE BORDER

-- ASSIGN A HIGH DIPLOMATIC PRIORITY TO CROP ERADICATION PROGRAMS IN PRODUCING COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY MEXICO, COLOMBIA, PERU AND BOLIVIA;

-- IN FURTHERANCE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT DRUG SMUGGLING ACROSS THE SOUTHWEST BORDER, A RADAR SYSTEM MUST BE INSTALLED TO PROTECT OUR SHORES AND BORDERS AGAINST DRUG SMUGGLING VESSELS AND AIRCRAFT. SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD ALSO CLOSE A GAP IN OUR MILITARY DEFENSES TO PROTECT THE NATION FROM ATTACKS BY TERRORISTS AND OTHER WOULD BE ENEMIES;

-- PROVIDE INCREASED RESOURCES TO DEA, CUSTOMS, COAST GUARD AND THE BORDER PATROL TO COMBAT THE INCREASED DRUG SMUGGLING THREAT ACROSS THE BORDER;

-- DEVELOP A UNIFIED DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND INTERDICTION STRATEGY FOR THE MEXICAN BORDER TO ASSURE COORDINATION OF DEA, BORDER PATROL AND U.S. CUSTOMS DRUG ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS;

-- DEVELOP JOINT MEXICAN-U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS WITHIN 60-100 MILES OF BOTH SIDES OF THE BORDER;

-- REQUIRE DEPARTING AIRCRAFT TO FILE FLIGHT PLANS AND RETURNING PLANES TO LAND AT DESIGNATED AIRPORTS TO CLEAR CUSTOMS; CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FOR "HOT PURSUIT" OF SUSPECTED SMUGGLING AIRCRAFT INTO THEIR TERRITORY; AND

-- ESTABLISH EPIC, THE EL PASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER, AS AN ALL SOURCE NARCOTIC INTELLIGENCE CENTER.

IN MEXICO

-- ASSIGN THE HIGHEST PRIORITY TO HELPING MEXICO DEVELOP A "HIGH TECH" CAPABILITY TO SURVEY THE EXTENT OF OPIUM AND MARIJUANA PRODUCTION IN MEXICO, PINPOINT CULTIVATION FOR ERADICATION, AND VERIFY THE DESTRUCTION OF ILLICIT NARCOTICS CROPS;

-- ENSURE THAT MEXICO HAS SUFFICIENT MANPOWER, EQUIPMENT AND OPERATING FUNDS, AND IS USING THESE RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY, TO PROGRESSIVELY ELIMINATE A LARGE SHARE OF THIS ILLICIT POPPY AND MARIJUANA CROP EACH YEAR;

-- ASSIST MEXICO IN EVERY WAY POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP AN EFFECTIVE SYSTEM TO BRING TO PROSECUTION MAJOR NARCOTICS CONSPIRACY CASES; AND

-- TO IMPROVE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE DEA AND THE MEXICAN FEDERAL JUDICIAL POLICE (MFJP), ORGANIZE TWO SMALL UNITS, ONE IN MEXICO CITY AND ONE IN WASHINGTON, D.C., STAFFED BY A SMALL NUMBER OF MFJP INVESTIGATORS AND MEXICAN INSTRUCTIONAL JUDGES PLUS DEA AGENTS AND JUSTICE DEPARTMENT ATTORNEYS. EACH OFFICE UTILIZING ITS BINATIONAL EXPERTISE WOULD OVERSEE THE COLLECTION AND PREPARATION OF EVIDENCE FOR TRANSMITTAL FOR PROSECUTION PURPOSES TO THE OTHER COUNTRY.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20229

REFER TO

6 AUG 1986

The Honorable Benjamin Gilman
Member of Congress
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.   20515

Dear Mr. Gilman:

During the July 22, 1986 hearing before the International Task Force on Narcotics, you asked Mr. William Rosenblatt, Assistant Commissioner (Enforcement) U.S. Customs, for information concerning the way Customs processed those who they found were smuggling narcotics contraband across U.S. borders. You suggested in your statement that smugglers caught red-handed were being allowed to pay a civil monetary fine and then go free. As a result of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by assistant U. S. Attorneys and state prosecuters, some drug smugglers apprehended by Customs at ports of entry do, in fact, avoid criminal charges and incarceration. This does not prevent the Customs Service from exacting monetary penalties from the drug offenders. It should be noted that Customs has no controlling influence over the U. S. Attorney's offices that have jurisdiction over federal prosecution of such cases. A short historical discussion should serve to explain current procedures.

Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1973 delineates the areas of responsibility on narcotics for the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Customs Service. It is very clear that the follow-up investigation and prosecution referral on drug smuggling cases is to be done by the Drug Enforcement Administration. When DEA does refer a drug smuggling case to the local Assistant U.S. Attorney there is no guarantee that that case will be accepted for criminal prosecution. In fact, very often these cases are not accepted and as a result, no criminal prosecution takes place.

Customs action on drug smuggling:

Whether or not a criminal prosecution goes forward, Customs does have the power to assess monetary penalties against those who attempt to smuggle controlled substances into the United

States. This assessment is done in accordance with the Administrative Penalty and Remission chart that is attached to this paper. Customs Commissioner William von Raab has, in the past year, established a stronger enforcement posture with regard to civil administrative penalties for controlled drugs.

On March 29, 1985, a telex was circulated to Customs nationwide to establish a stronger enforcement posture with regard to civil administrative penalties for controlled drugs. The penalties for failure to declare small amounts of controlled substances were revised so as to make their imposition mandatory and to double the then existing penalty amounts. For example, the penalty for carrying one ounce of marijuana was raised from $75 to $150. An amended civil administrative penalty/remission chart (copy attached) was subsequently issued and circulated to the field. Additionally, if a seizure of controlled substances in excess of any amount recorded on the chart was made and no criminal prosecution was undertaken, the field was instructed to assess further penalties equal to the following amounts: marijuana, $100 for each ounce over 32; hashish, $20 for each gram over 72; liquid hashish, $100 per gram over 16; dangerous drugs, $200 per each lot of 50 pills over 450; for hallucinogens, $50 for each dose over 18; cocaine, $200 for each gram over 14; and opiates, $200 for each gram over 14. At this time, a policy of vigorous collection action against all individuals not complying with subsequent demands for payment was also directed. Moreover, execution of a promissory note was required from all violators who did not settle these penalties on the spot. The field was instructed that in no instance would petitioning rights be compromised by execution of such promissory notes.

I hope this brief explanation of Customs role in the processing of drug smuggling offenders is helpful. Please don't hesitate to call me at 566-5644 with further questions.

Sincerely,

David F. Gencarelli
Director
Congressional Affairs

Civil Administrative Penalty/Remission Chart

	MARIJUANA	HASHISH	LIQUID HASHISH	DANGEROUS DRUGS	HALLUCINOGENS	COCAINE	OPIATES
$150	1 ounce or less	8 grams or less	1 gram or less	50 pills or less	2 dosage units or less		
$300	Over 1 ounce, not over 4 ounces	Over 8 grams, not over 16 grams	Over 1 gram, not over 2 grams	Over 50 pills not over 100 pills	Over 2 doses, not over 4 doses	1 gram or less	1 gram or less
$450	Over 4 ounces Not over 8 ounces	Over 16 grams, not over 24 grams	Over 2 grams, not over 4 grams	Over 100 pills, not over 150 pills	Over 4 doses, not over 6 doses	Over 1 gram, not over 2 grams	Over 1 gram, not over 2 grams
$600	Over 8 ounces not over 12 ounces	Over 24 grams, not over 32 grams	Over 4 grams, not over 6 grams	Over 150 pills, not over 200 pills	Over 6 doses, not over 8 doses	Over 2 grams, not over 4 grams	Over 2 grams, not over 4 grams
$750	Over 12 ounces not over 16 ounces	Over 32 grams not over 40 grams	Over 6 grams, not over 8 grams	Over 200 pills not over 250 pills	Over 8 doses, not over 10 doses	Over 4 grams not over 6 grams	Over 4 grams, not over 6 grams
$900	Over 16 ounces, not over 20 ounces	Over 40 grams, not over 48 grams	Over 8 grams, not over 10 grams	Over 250 pills not over 300 pills	Over 10 doses, not over 12 doses	Over 6 grams, not over 8 grams	Over 6 grams, not over 8 grams
$1,050	Over 20 ounces not over 24 ounces	Over 48 grams, not over 56 grams	Over 10 grams, not over 12 grams	Over 300 pills, not over 350 pills	Over 12 doses, not over 14 doses	Over 8 grams, not over 10 grams	Over 8 grams, not over 10 grams
$1,200	Over 24 ounces not over 28 ounces	Over 56 grams, not over 64 grams	Over 12 grams, not over 14 grams	Over 350 pills not over 400 pills	Over 14 doses, not over 16 doses	Over 10 grams, not over 12 grams	Over 10 grams, not over 12 grams
$1,350	Over 28 ounces not over 32 ounces	Over 64 grams not over 72 grams	Over 14 grams not over 16 grams	Over 400 pills not over 450 pills	Over 16 doses, not over 18 doses	Over 12 grams not over 14 grams	Over 12 grams, not over 14 grams

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

9 JUL 1986

Honorable Charles B. Rangel
Chairman
Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter dated June 10, 1986 suggesting the use of military resources to secure our national borders against the threat of illegal drug trafficking.

I share your belief that we need an effective nationwide campaign against illicit narcotics, and the Department of Defense stands ready to assist those agencies charged by law for drug enforcement. The Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service/Border Patrol, Coast Guard, and Drug Enforcement Administration could best determine if a "border sovereignty system" would be feasible to enforce the criminal laws concerning drug trafficking.

The Department of Defense is becoming increasingly involved in supporting drug interdiction. The recent National Security Decision Directive on "Narcotics as a National Security Threat" reflects President Reagan's emphasis on an expanded role for the military in supporting the counter-narcotics efforts of the drug law enforcement agencies. We are working closely with other agencies to share surveillance information on air and surface traffic; to share intelligence information; and to enhance civilian agency capability to make necessary arrests, searches, and seizures through the loan of equipment. This policy is consistent with current law which authorizes military assistance consistent with military preparedness, but which prohibits the military from performing direct law enforcement actions such as search, seizure, and arrest.

I am enclosing a copy of a letter from the Attorney General to the Congress which outlines the key elements of the Administration's plan for drug law enforcement. The plan demonstrates our willingness to support the nation's campaign against illicit narcotics. I can assure you of my continuing personal commitment to assist law enforcement agencies stem the flow of illicit drugs.

Sincerely,

Enclosure

CHARLES B. RANGEL, NEW YORK
CHAIRMAN

PETER W. RODINO, JR., NEW JERSEY
FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK, CALIFORNIA
JAMES H. SCHEUER, NEW YORK
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LAWRENCE J. SMITH, FLORIDA
EDOLPHUS "ED" TOWNS, NEW YORK

U.S. House of Representatives
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
ROOM H2-234, HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, DC 20515

COMMITTEE PHONE 202/226-3040

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, NEW YORK
RANKING MINORITY MEMBER

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JOHN T. CUSACK
CHIEF OF STAFF
ELLIOTT A. BROWN
MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

June 10, 1986

The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301-1155

Dear Mr. Secretary:

On May 16, 1986, the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control held a hearing in Miami, Florida concerning Federal narcotics interdiction efforts in the South Florida and Caribbean area.

As you know, the President's South Florida Task Force on Crime, under the leadership of Vice President Bush, was formed in early 1982 in response to the overwhelming volume of drug smuggling in that part of the country. Since that time many Federal dollars, increased resources, manpower and technology, and innovative techniques have been brought into South Florida to enhance the "war on drugs" in this critical area.

However, notwithstanding this effort, and all the resources and talent directed toward the drug enforcement and interdiction effort in the Southeast, there has been little, if any, impact on the availability of illicit drugs on the streets of the United States. Data made available to the Select Committee by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) shows that the trafficking of illicit drugs into South Florida remains unabated. While Federal drug seizures in Florida are steadily increasing, they are indicative of increasing supplies of illegal drugs being directed at the U.S. from foreign sources.

The daily breach of our borders by drug traffickers is a direct threat to our sovereignty and national security. Our borders, in the southeast and along the border with Mexico, are violated every day by enemy ships and planes. It makes little sense to spend hundreds of billions of dollars on "national defense" when our own borders are wide open and defenseless. The implication are clear. As Florida Governor Bob Graham pointed out at our Miami hearing, "Today an undetected Cessna brings in a cargo of drugs. Tomorrow an undetected plane could bring terrorists -- and bombs".

Accordingly, I respectfully request that the Department of Defense prepare a plan detailing what would be required to use the military resources of the United States to secure our national borders. Such a plan should include a cost analysis of the technology, equipment, manpower, and other resources required to fully defend our sovereignty. In addition, the plan should include a time frame as to when a border sovereignty system could be put in place, and how this system should be managed within the defense establishment.

I know that you share the importance of our nation's fight against drug abuse. Increasingly that effort and safeguarding our national security are becoming inextricably wedded. The development of a border sovereignty plan by the Department of Defense would be of immense assistance to the Congress in developing effective national security and drug abuse policy.

I look forward to your plan.

Sincerely,

Charles B Rangel

CHARLES B. RANGEL
Chairman

U.S. Department of Justice

National Drug Enforcement Policy Board

Attorney General, Chairman

18 June 1986

Honorable Jamie L. Whitten
Chairman, Committee
  on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The DOD Authorization Bill for FY 1986 called for the establishment of an Air Force Special Operations drug interdiction air wing to provide peacetime air interdiction surveillance and detection assistance to drug enforcement authorities.

The conference report accompanying the FY 1986 Appropriations Act (appended to the Continuing Resolution) required the Department of Defense to configure one AC-130H-30 stretched variant gunship for drug interdiction surveillance deliverable not later than January 31, 1987. Thirty-five million dollars were appropriated for this purpose. The Conference Report also suggested that DOD should consider budgeting for an additional nine AC-130H-30 gunships during FY88-89.

In my letter to you on February 12, 1986, I expressed the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board's concern that the C-130 gunship was not the most cost effective means of providing air surveillance and detection (Enclosure 1). Further, I suggested that the Policy Board would work with the Congress to identify appropriate resources best suited for drug surveillance and intelligence needs, consistent with DOD mission requirements.

In an April 18, 1986 letter to the Vice President, Senator DeConcini and Representative English proposed a plan to implement the DOD Air Wing (Enclosure 2). This plan provides for seven aerostat radar surveillance balloons (two in the Bahamas and five along the U.S. Southern tier); ten C-130 aircraft retrofitted with target acquisition radars (two for SOUTHCOM; remaining eight divided equally between Florida and Arizona); and four Customs P-3A aircraft (or suitable platform) retrofitted with 360° radar.

The National Narcotics Act of 1984 empowered the Policy Board to review, evaluate and develop United States Government policy, strategy and resources with respect to drug law enforcement efforts. Accordingly, on May 19, 1986, the Vice President asked the Policy Board to review the Congressional plan. The Policy Board analyzed the plan and agrees that certain parts of it would help address the problem along the Southern tier.

Specifically, they are: placing five aerostats along the Southwest border, moving Air Force helicopter assets to Davis Monthan AFB, and providing two C-130's to SOUTHCOM to assist drug law enforcement on a not-to-interfere-with-mission basis. The Board believes that the location of the aerostats and other detection assets should be determined by those agencies responsible for their operation.

In addition to the above elements from the Congressional plan, the Policy Board proposes modifications which address interdiction needs and also provide an effective enhancement to the Government's overall anti-drug effort. The alternative proposal constitutes a Government-wide package that will initiate improvements in several of the critical components of the drug strategy. They are presented in Enclosure 3.

The total cost of our proposal is $232.9 million (plus one year O&M of $33M), compared with $309M (plus $61M O&M) for the Congressional plan. Not only would this alternative cost the taxpayers less, the Policy Board believes that it would also be more effective. Our proposal simultaneously addresses several of the key elements of the strategy in a balanced approach, rather than focusing solely on interdiction assets.

While I believe that our proposal fully addresses the needs along the Southwest border, the differences in terrain and threat along the Southeast border pose a more complex set of problems. As an interim solution, the Policy Board endorses the substitution of E-2C's for P-3A's as air surveillance platforms. The P-3A's would then be returned to DOD. (In our view, the E-2C is superior to the P-3A in terms of cost, effectiveness and availability.) However, the Policy Board must emphasize that it is prudent to study other air surveillance modalities before final determination is made for the Southeast border. We will forward to the Congress, following the Policy Board's expedited review, a complementary report for the Southeast border.

I know you share our concern over the adverse impact illicit drug trafficking has on our nation. On behalf of the Board, please be assured of our willingness to work with the Congress to effect measures to end this national scourge. I have sent identical letters to Chairmen Goldwater, Hatfield, and Aspin.

Sincerely,

Edwin Meese III

EDWIN MEESE III
Attorney General

Enclosures

cc: Honorable George Bush
The Vice President
of the United States

U.S. Department of Justice

National Drug Enforcement Policy Board

Attorney General, Chairman

February 12, 1986

Honorable Jamie L. Whitten
Chairman, Committee
on Appropriations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The National Narcotics Act of 1984 created the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDEPB) and empowered it to review, evaluate and develop United States Government policy, strategy and resources with respect to illegal drug law enforcement efforts, including budgetary priorities and a National and International Drug Law Enforcement Strategy. Further, it designated the Attorney General as the Chairman of the NDEPB and the primary advisor to the President and Congress on national and international drug law enforcement programs and policies developed by the Board.

In carrying out the Board's responsibilities, we have recently analyzed our air interdiction surveillance capabilities. In the course of our review it was brought to the Policy Board's attention that the conference report accompanying the FY 1986 Appropriations Act requires the Department of Defense to configure one AC-130H-30 stretched variant gunship for drug interdiction surveillance. Thirty-five million dollars have been appropriated for this purpose. (It is important to note that the $35M appropriation will not provide sufficient funds to fully equip the aircraft with all of the gunship unique subsystems described in the conference report.) Conference language states that the Air Force Special Operations Forces (SOF) would be the appropriate choice to carry out this new mission. The NDEPB has serious reservations about the effectiveness of such an approach.

The Defense Department has concluded that utilization of a gunship in a manner prescribed by the conference report will not satisfy highly intensive training requirements for personnel who operate sophisticated gunship systems aboard the aircraft. As the Chief of Staff of the Air Force stated in his July 3, 1985, letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees,

"SOF training requires highly accurate navigation

> to a precise point to fulfill stringent training requirements attendant to clandestine infiltration/exfiltration and resupply of ground and naval teams. This mission is the antithesis of broad area search and surveillance which the drug mission requires." (my emphasis).

Accordingly, the NDEPB is concerned that the conference report is too specific regarding hardware and mission, and that it eliminates the flexibility to determine the most effective manner of implementing the intent of the conference report, consistent with the needs of military preparedness.

The members of the NDEPB have concluded that the AC-130H-30 is not the most cost effective means of providing air interdiction surveillance and detection. Accordingly, we believe that the Policy Board should work with the Congress and the law enforcement community to identify appropriate resources best suited to serve drug surveillance and intelligence needs that also meet DOD mission requirements.

The coordination and cooperation between the legislative and executive branches have been important factors in this country's battle against illicit drug trafficking. I look forward to continuing cooperation in the future. I have sent identical letters to Chairmen Goldwater, Hatfield, and Aspin.

Sincerely,

Edwin Meese III

EDWIN MEESE III
Attorney General

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

12 June 1986

Dear Mr. Vice President:

This responds to your May 19, 1986 letter concerning a DOD Congressional drug initiative offered by Senator DeConcini and Congressman English and a similarly constructed DOD plan.

The National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDEPB) will take the following action with regard to the DOD proposal:

o Appoint an interagency working group, under the direction of the Policy Board's Staff, to determine the implications of the DOD plan on the other agencies.

o Review the working group's recommendations in light of other possible drug enforcement expenditures.

o Inform the Congress of our position. I am mindful of the time sensitivity of this issue and assure you that it will receive immediate consideration.

As Chairman of the Policy Board I wish to extend our appreciation for your continued support in these matters.

Sincerely,

Ed

Edwin Meese III

The Honorable George Bush
The Vice President of the
United States
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20500

THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986

Honorable Edwin Meese, III
Chairman, National Drug
Enforcement Policy Board
U. S. Department of Justice
10th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Ed:

Our staffs have been working together to ensure a proper response is made to Congressional interests on several issues having budgetary, resource or policy implications. I ask that as Chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDEPB) that you take the appropriate timely action on the attached letter as it contains a list of items not unlike the one recently sent to you by the Secretary of Defense for consideration.

My National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) staff is available to assist your NDEPB staff in ensuring that all aspects of the Department of Defense and the Congressional proposal are considered. I look forward to working with you in continuing our mutual efforts to promote a workable strategy on drug law enforcement.

Best personal regards,

George Bush

Enclosure:

Copy of Senator DeConcini/Congressman English's
letter dated April 18, 1986 to Vice President Bush

[illegible]

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 18, 1986

The Honorable George Bush
Vice President of the
United States
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Vice President:

On November 15, 1985, President Reagan signed into law the Defense Authorization Bill for FY 1986 -- a bill that contained, among other things, an historic initiative to establish, for the first time in our history, a permanent drug interdiction assistance mission within the Department of Defense. Specifically, Public Law 99-145 contained the bulk of a proposal that we introduced earlier in the year that would establish an Air Force Special Operations drug interdiction "Air Wing" that would provide full time, peacetime drug interdiction service to the nation. Funding for initial start-up of the Air Wing was signed into law by the President in the Continuing Resolution, 1986 (P.L. 99-190).

Since December, our staffs; the staffs of the Air Force, Navy, and the Secretary of Defense's Drug Enforcement Task Force, under the direction of General R. Dean Tice; and other interested private sector groups have been working to formulate an appropriate implementation plan for the new Air Force drug interdiction mission. These have not been easy negotiations. However, as sponsors of the original enabling legislation, we have proposed a compromise plan that appears to have strong support within the Department and which would achieve the objectives outlined in both the DoD Authorization Bill and the Continuing Resolution. The purpose of this letter is to briefly outline the plan that we have proposed to the Department and to reinforce our sincere interest in you as Head of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) joining with us in implementing this important new drug interdiction initiative.

The Air Wing plan that came out of both the DoD Authorization Bill and Continuing Resolution called for the establishment of a Special Operations Component within the Air Force force struture, including a fleet of ten, AC-130H gunship surveillance aircraft to be retrofit with sophisticated target acquisition radar. An appropriation of $35 million was provided in the Continuing Resolution to develop the first prototype of the ten aircraft and to initiate plans for full implementation of the Air Wing. Because of concerns within the Air Force over the designation of the AC-130 aircraft for the mission, we developed a compromise plan that would incorporate the initial concept contained in the enabling legislation i.e., for a full time drug interdiction "wing" within the Department of Defense, but which broadened the base of participation and the type of resources to be put into the new Air Wing program. Specifically, our plan, as proposed to the Air Force in February, contains the following elements:

AIR FORCE WILL PROVIDE:

7- Full scale aerostat radar surveillance balloons, to be located along the Southwest border (4); in the Bahamas at Georgetown (1); in the Panhandle of Florida (1); and in either the Turks/Caicos Islands; or in the southern end of the Bahamas archipelago.

10- C-130 aircraft to be retrofit with appropriate air target acquisition radar, probably F-15 or APG-164 radar, including eight (8) penetrating tanker model C-130 aircraft and two (2) regular C-130 models for deployment in SOUTHCOM out of Panama.

The C-130 tanker aircraft with radar would be deployed out of Duke Field in Florida (4) and Davis Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona (4) and be linked with existing HH-53 refuelable helicopters for use in the Wing.

* The 302nd Special Operations Squadron currently located at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona would be shifted to Davis Monthan Air Force Base near Tucson to be co-located with the C-130 Tanker Aircraft

* The 301st Special Operations Squadron would be located at Duke Field in Florida, also co-located with existing helicopter assets.

NAVY WILL PROVIDE:

4- P-3A, P-3B, or other appropriate platforms to be retrofit with APS-138, 360-degree radar and turned over to the U.S. Customs Service to be used for drug interdiction and surveillance purposes in that important drug interdiction agency. The Navy would handle the integration of the radar on the P-3 or other aircraft; manage the contracts that would be awarded to complete this task; and provide technical assistance to Customs prior to and after delivery of the aircraft. Customs would then provide the operation and maintenance of the aircraft, as they are now doing with their P-3A model aircraft with F-15 radar.

It is our understanding that this proposal has been approved at certain levels within the Pentagon and is awaiting final approval by the Secretary of Defense. We are also informed that your staff may be cognizant of this proposal and would be willing to sit down with our respective staffs to discuss the details of the plan in the near future. More importantly, we strongly believe that you, as the head of the President's national interdiction effort, can play the crucial role in the implementation of this initiative and we encourage you to do so. Of course, we stand ready to work with you in anyway we can to see that this compromise plan will be approved and implemented as quickly as possible. The drug threat to our borders dictates that we must bring the military into the War on Drugs in a way that is proper, effective, and within the confines of the Posse Comitatus restraints imposed by law. The President's Commission on Organized Crime concurs. We believe that our plan, as outlined above, is a plan that will work and which can be put into action promptly.

Thank you for your commitment to the drug interdiction effort and for your willingness to consider this plan of attack against the narcotics trafficker. We look forward to working with you to accomplish our mutual objectives.

Sincerely,

Glenn English
U.S. Representative

Dennis DeConcini
Dennis DeConcini
U.S. Senator

POLICY BOARD'S ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL*

Interdiction	
Items from Congressional plan:	
o 5 Aerostats for Southwest border**	$ 62.5M
o Transfer 6 Air Force Helicopters to Davis Monthan AFB in Arizona***	$ 15M
o 2 C-130's to Southcom***	$ 79.4M
Other items:	
o Customs Service Command, Control, Communication's Intelligence Center (C^{3}I) for the Southwest border	$ 10M
o An All-Source Intelligence Center to modify or replace the existing El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)	$ 15M
o 4 E-2C's for Southern border**	$ 14M
International/Intelligence	
o DEA foreign agents	$ 4M
o Intelligence Community**	$ 12M
Investigations	
o DEA voice privacy radios	$ 7M
Drug Prosecution	
o U.S. Attorneys	$ 6M
Drug Abuse Prevention	
o National Institute of Drug Abuse	$ 3M
o ACTION	$ 5M
TOTAL:	$232.9M

* Additional O&M for full year operation is estimated at $33M.

** Acquisition funded by DOD; O&M funded by other agencies.

*** Acquisition and O&M funded by DOD.

Enclosure 3